Interest Group Survival: Shared Interests Versus Competition for Resources

Haider‐Markel, Donald P.

doi:10.2307/2998643

Cited by 34 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Early entrants were able to establish a niche for themselves and did not decline even after competition effects should have set in. Haider-Markel (1997) showed that organizations for gays and lesbians avoided direct competition with each other, and as a consequence the expansion of one organization led to growth in others.…”

Section: Deterministic Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Survival in local voluntary associations

Wollebæk

2009

Nonprofit Mgmnt & Ldrshp

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Past analyses of organizational failure and success include studies of traditional social movements (Sandell, 2001;Stern, 1999), interest organizations Lowery, 1995, 1997;Haider-Markel, 1997;Nownes and Lipinski, 2005), and new social movements (Edwards and Marullo, 1995;Minkoff, 1993Minkoff, , 1997. Most of these, however, focus exclusively on factors outside the organization' s control or on organizational design and strategy. Some explore hypotheses derived from organizational ecology such as density dependence or the liabilities of newness and smallness, but do not investigate how successful design or leadership may help overcome such liabilities. Conversely, studies that focus on organizational design often fail to take into account how environmental factors limit the options available to organizational leaders. This article argues, and offers findings to support, that neither approach is sufficient to understand organizational survival; factors both outside and within the organization' s control contribute crucial pieces to the puzzle.Note: I thank Roger A. Lohmann, Per Selle, and the anonymous reviewers for invaluable comments on previous drafts.

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Section: Deterministic Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Survival in local voluntary associations

Wollebæk

2009

Nonprofit Mgmnt & Ldrshp

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“…Previous studies have approached the formation of issue niches as a yes or no question; either groups form niches or they do not Haider-Markel, 1997). This approach is consistent with Browne's (1990) argument that all groups seek to pursue issue niches.…”

Section: Lobbying and Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Scholars have focused on the questions of whether the macro-structures of policy domains are balkanized (e.g., Baumgartner & Leech, 2001;Haider-Markel, 1997;Nownes, 2000) and whether the desire to form issue niches is a strategic motivator at the group level (e.g., Heaney, 2004;Hojnacki, 1997). However, the question of how interest groups build their identities on Capitol Hill has been subject to relatively little scrutiny.…”

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confidence: 99%

Outside the Issue Niche

Heaney

2004

American Politics Research

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Interest groups care deeply about, and struggle to shape, their identities on Capitol Hill. A group's identity is what makes it unique and separates it from other organizations in the advocacy community. Previous research has argued that interest group identities are formed by creating exclusive niches over narrow policy issues, but this research has neglected the degree to which groups depend on representation, ideology, and advocacy techniques in establishing their uniqueness. The author argues that interest group identities are formed in multiple dimensions, with issues serving as an important, but nondominant, basis for identification. Qualitative and quantitative methods are used to analyze data from interviews with representatives of 168 national interest groups working on health care. The findings provide a basis for bridging theories of group maintenance and influence by demonstrating that identity encourages groups to consider simultaneously the ways their behaviors are perceived on Capitol Hill and by their members.

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“…Browne (1990) introduced the idea that groups strive to differentiate themselves in Washington by establishing a balkanized niche 'characterized by obsessive focus on a single facet' of policy (p. 489). A host of empirical evidence has accumulated to show that groups indeed gravitate toward issues and policy domains that are sparsely populated so that they may have a greater impact on the policy process Lowery, 1996, 1997;Hojnacki, 1997;Haider-Markel, 1997;Heaney, 2004a). Heaney (2004bHeaney ( , 2014 goes so far as to show that one of the primary strategic functions of an interest group is to create unique identity as a way to maximize their perceived policy expertise and to minimize competition.…”

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confidence: 97%

The two worlds of lobbying: Washington lobbyists in the core and on the periphery

2014

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For decades, political scientists have had two divergent views on lobbyists in Washington. On the one hand they focus on the privileged access of a few groups in balkanized issue niches, and on the other they observe highly inclusive lobbying campaigns where hundreds of lobbyists vigorously compete for policymakers' attention. Not surprisingly, these disparate observations lead to contradictory conclusions about lobbying tactics, relations with relevant policymakers and the nature of interest group influence. In this article, we make a simple, yet novel, empirical observation: these seemingly incongruent observations of lobbying at the micro level are not inconsistent when we uncover the structure of lobbyists' interactions at the macro level. That is, both views are correct, depending on the policy context. Using data from 248 543 Lobbying Disclosure Act reports filed between 1998 and 2008 -which consists of 1 557 526 observations of 32 700 individual lobbyists reporting activity in 78 issue areas -we reveal that the Washington lobbying community has a fundamental and stable core-periphery structure. We then document how the empirically derived core-periphery mapping is a superior way to differentiate bandwagon or niche policy domains. As transaction cost theory suggests, we find that policy domains in the core have more in-house lobbyists and more revolving door lobbyists. And, on average, lobbyists active in core domains represent a greater diversity of interests and tend to be policy generalists. The converse is also true. Highly specialized contract lobbyists drift toward those sparsely populated domains in the periphery where they may focus on obscure policy minutiae, relatively free from public scrutiny. Our findings have important implications for the study of lobbying and interest representation. In Washington, there are really two worlds of lobbying. The first world, where most lobbying attention is directed, is one in which we see a great deal of interconnectedness and interest diversity. The second world, home to an overwhelming majority of policy domains, cultivates niche lobbying and policy balkanization. That these two worlds exist simultaneously is precisely why observers fail to agree on what 'typical' or 'average' lobbying is. We believe that this is why the political science literature on

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Interest Group Survival: Shared Interests Versus Competition for Resources

Cited by 34 publications

References 12 publications

Survival in local voluntary associations

Survival in local voluntary associations

Outside the Issue Niche

The two worlds of lobbying: Washington lobbyists in the core and on the periphery

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