Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

Potters, Jan; Sloof, Randolph

doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(96)00008-0

Cited by 214 publications

(129 citation statements)

References 191 publications

(363 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

114

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…(10) is estimated using a fixed effects specification (results from a random effects specification are available upon request). (see Potters and Sloof 1996). MANsh may alternatively capture the degree to which an economy consists of pollution intensive manufacturing.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutionalized pollution havens

Cole¹,

Fredriksson²

2009

Ecological Economics

110

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper provides a lobby group theory based on Prat and Rustichini (Econometrica 2003) which suggests that the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policies is conditional on the structure of host countries' political institutions. In particular, FDI raises environmental policy stringency where the number of legislative units (such as the chambers of parliament or congress, government parties, the president, or the prime minister) are many, but reduces it where the legislative units are few. Our panel data evidence is fully consistent with this prediction. Pollution havens are thus more likely to occur in countries with institutional structures involving few legislative units. Finally, we show the empirical importance of endogenizing environmental policy in pollution haven hypothesis studies. Only when environmental policy is treated as endogenous does environmental policy stringency have a significant negative effect on FDI. This sheds new light on the existing literature on the pollution haven hypothesis.

show abstract

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutionalized pollution havens

Cole¹,

Fredriksson²

2009

Ecological Economics

110

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Firstly, notwithstanding the huge number of empirical studies there are relatively few 'stylized facts', basically showing that contributions and lobbying, the size of organized membership, and an interest group's stake are positive determinants of influence, whereas the presence of an oppositional force in the political arena, electoral pressures, and the presence of a wellinformed electorate are negative determinants (Potters and Sloof 1996). The main problems are a serious lack of data and a shortage of hypotheses derived from theoretical models that provide structure and a base for embedding.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 Early modeling of interest groups, during the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, had difficulty in dealing simultaneously with the 1 The (field) empirical literature is surveyed in Potters and Sloof (1996). discusses the relatively small number of experimental studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest Group Behavior and Influence

Winden¹

2008

Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…An example will be presented below, building on a simple influential function approach inspired by Becker (1983). 15 We assume that the decision about the level of environmental regulation in a country is determined by the lobbing activities of two pressure groups: An industrial group (IG) lobbying for no reductions and an environmental group (EG) lobbying for high reductions. 16 The more pressure a group exerts, the more it influences the policy outcome.…”

Section: Alternative Specification Of the Information Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This requires a reinterpretation of the cost and benefit functions associated with reducing emis- 15 See also Potters and Sloof (1996) for a survey of this type of model.…”

Section: Alternative Specification Of the Information Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

Unilateral actions, the case of international environmental problems

Brandt

2004

Resource and Energy Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Unilateral actions the case of international environmental problems Urs Steiner Brandt April 2003All rights reserved. No part of this WORKING PAPER may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the written permission of IME except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. AbstractWhen abatement costs are uncertain, but correlated, and a country becomes privately informed that costs are low, then unilateral actions serve as a signalling devise to reveal low costs and unilateral actions have the potential to trigger positive responses abroad. However, the country engaging in unilateral actions is the one with the highest expectation about the other countries' reactions, and it might suffer from an effect like the winners curse.JEL Classification: Q28, H4, D8

show abstract

Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

Cited by 214 publications

References 191 publications

Institutionalized pollution havens

Institutionalized pollution havens

Interest Group Behavior and Influence

Unilateral actions, the case of international environmental problems

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About