Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments

Abstract

One feature associated with democratic governance is frequent leadership turnover. While the ease of replacing leaders improves accountability, it may impede the ability of democracies to make credible long-term international commitments. Using newly collected data that identify cases in which leaders who derive their support from different domestic interests come to power, we evaluate the effects of changes in domestic political leadership on one important aspect of foreign policy-decisions to maintain military alliances. An analysis covering bilateral alliances between 1919 and 2001 reveals that changes in societal supporting coalitions in nondemocratic states are associated with decisions to abrogate alliances prior to their scheduled end dates, but changes in societal supporting coalitions in democracies have no effect on the probability of premature alliance termination. We conclude that international cooperation is sensitive to changes in core supporting coalitions, but that this effect is moderated by democratic political institutions.

Capability Change, Economic Dependence and Alliance Termination

“…Siverson and Starr (1994) find that drastic domestic political changes, such as a military coup that may alter the rules of the game under which domestic politics is played out, may affect alliance policy. Leeds et al (2009) also find that leadership changes accompanied by changes in societal supporting coalitions increase the likelihood of alliance termination, although such an effect is more prominent in nondemocratic regimes than in democratic regimes. These findings suggest that domestic political changes involving domestic institutional changes, or the emergence of new domestic political forces, can affect existing foreign policy in general and alliance policy in particular.…”

“…Several empirical studies suggest that changes in capabilities are associated with alliance termination (Morrow 1991;Bennett 1997;Leeds and Savun 2007;Leeds, Mattes and Vogel 2009). However, most do not specify which side's change in capabilities is associated with alliance termination.…”

“…1997; Leeds and Savun 2007;Leeds, Mattes and Vogel 2009). However, it is not clear whether or how changes in the capabilities of the weaker state affect alliance termination and under what conditions it is more likely.…”

“…In the original dataset, the leadership change variable that accounts for a change in the societal supporting coalitions is a count variable because SOLSchange can occur more than once 20 This distinction between institutional change and social preference change is intended to isolate one effect from the other, as in Leeds et al (2009). 21 I use this coding rule because major powers are less likely to undergo institutional change than are minor powers.…”

“…In previous empirical analysis, Morrow (1991) and Bennett (1997) aggregate the capabilities of allied members and test how changes in aggregated capabilities affect alliance termination. Leeds and Savun (2007) and Leeds et al (2009) take a different approach. They identify factors that can affect the valuation of the alliance and then explain how changes in those factors are associated with alliance termination in violation of the terms.…”