Interference between cues of the same outcome depends on the causal interpretation of the events

Abstract

In an interference-between-cues design, the expression of a learned Cue A --> Outcome 1 association has been shown to be impaired if another cue, B, is separately paired with the same outcome in a second learning phase. In the present study, we assessed whether this interference effect is mediated by participants' previous causal knowledge. This was achieved by having participants learn in a diagnostic situation in Experiment 1a, and then by manipulating the causal order of the learning task in Experiments 1b and 2. If participants use their previous causal knowledge during the learning process, interference should only be observed in the diagnostic situation because only there we have a common cause (Outcome 1) of two disjoint effects, namely cues A and B. Consistent with this prediction, interference between cues was only found in Experiment 1a and in the diagnostic conditions of Experiments 1b and 2.

Previously acquired cue–outcome structural knowledge guides new learning: Evidence from the retroactive-interference-between-cues effect

“…Thus, it is important to make clear that the term RIBC should be used only for the empirical phenomenon or effect as it is described at the end of the first paragraph of the introduction (see also Houwer, 2007). Thus, the RIBC effect might be caused by memory interference, as is postulated by the retrieval deficit account, or by other psychological mechanisms-such as causal reasoning, as was proposed by Cobos et al (2007).…”

“…Although the RIBC account based on the causal model theory can explain most of the RIBC effects found within the HCL literature (see Cobos et al, 2007;Luque, Cobos, & López, 2008), it cannot explain why RIBC has been found in several HCL experiments in which the instructions did not describe cue-outcome relationships as causal relationships (Luque, Morís, & Cobos, 2010;Luque, Morís, Cobos, & López, 2009;Luque, Morís, Orgaz, Cobos, & Matute, 2011). However, in our opinion, even when no causal interpretation of the task may reasonably be expected, the RIBC effect may still be the result of reasoning processes based on abstract representations of cue-outcome relationships.…”

“…Despite the simplicity of this effect, most of the relevant HCL theories cannot account for the basic RIBC effect without post-hoc assumptions (Cobos, López, & Luque, 2007;Escobar, Pineño, & Matute, 2002;Matute & Pineño, 1998a, 1998bMiller & Escobar, 2002;Vadillo, Castro, Matute, & Wasserman, 2008). These ad-hoc RIBC accounts consist of adaptations of models originally designed to explain other phenomena, such as backward blocking (Dickinson & Burke, 1996;Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994) or extinction (Bouton, 1993).…”

“…For instance, some studies have shown top-down influences of general causal knowledge on the RIBC effect. RIBC becomes weak or nonexistent when participants are instructed that the cues (A and B in Table 1) are independent causes (e.g., two different medicines) producing a certain effect (e.g., headache relief; O1 in Table 1) (Cobos et al, 2007; cf. Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992).…”

“…Conversely, when cues and outcomes are interpreted as effects and causes, respectively, the RIBC effect is promoted since causes (O1) are not expected to produce negatively correlated effects (Cues A and B). Interestingly, most experiments on RIBC conducted so far have been framed within scenarios that are susceptible to causal interpretations that may favor the RIBC effect through reasoning and abstract representations of cue-outcome relationships (see Cobos et al, 2007, for a systematic review). The letters denote cues (cue A, B, and F [filler cues]), and the letter BOf ollowed by a number is used to denote the outcomes (Outcome 1, O1; Outcome 2, O2; Outcome 3, O3).…”