Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution

Alesina, Alberto; Stantcheva, Stefanie; Teso, Edoardo

doi:10.1257/aer.20162015

Cited by 695 publications

(643 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…With respect to the "attention check", only 0.82% of the respondents reported inattention during our survey. We used the same question used by Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2016), and these types of questions have been shown by Meade and Craig (2012) to identify careless survey takers, as well as enhance respondent's attention in the questions that follow. The reason why we asked individuals their levels of trust regarding the national government, major companies, and other seven groups/organizations is twofold.…”

Section: First Stage and Magnitude Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The main conclusion be comparing column 1 and 4 is that the populations are strikingly similar. Kuziemko, et al (2015) collected their sample between January 2011 and August 2012, and at least with respect to observables, it is 31 In a follow up survey that is explained in section 6, we introduced an "attention check" question mid-way through the survey as in Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso (2016). Only 0.82% of respondents reported some form of inattention at that point.…”

Section: Survey Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…36 Note that we are discussing the representativeness of the MTurk sample in the context of the US. Professional companies may be necessary to conduct surveys in other countries such as in Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2016).…”

Section: Survey Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Meet the Oligarchs: Business Legitimacy, State Capacity and Taxation

Tella

Dubra

Lagomarsino

2016

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We analyze the role of people's beliefs about the rich in the determination of public policy in the context of a randomized online survey experiment. A question we study is the desirability of government-private sector meetings, a variable we argue is connected to State capacity. Survey respondents primed with negative views about business leaders want fewer meetings, as well as higher taxes to the top 1% and more regulation. We also study how these effects change when subjects are (additionally) primed with positive/negative views about government officials. Distrust in the government increases the preferred tax rate on the top 1% only when business legitimacy is low. A model with multiple equilibria helps interpret these findings. In one of the equilibria, meetings are allowed, business legitimacy is high, and people set a low income tax rate for businesspeople. In the other, meetings are forbidden, business legitimacy is low, and people set high taxes to punish the businesspeople for their corrupt behavior.

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Section: First Stage and Magnitude Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Survey Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Meet the Oligarchs: Business Legitimacy, State Capacity and Taxation

Tella

Dubra

Lagomarsino

2016

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“…In the first case, we take ψ (a) = 0 for a < 1 and b (z) = 0, so that agents are only influenced by incomes higher than theirs. One motivation is that people might be overconfident about their probability of achieving high incomes, as they are optimistic about mobility in general (as in Bénabou and Tirole (2006a); Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso (2018)). Another might be that the top rates are very salient.…”

Section: Optimal Income Tax Formulamentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents

Farhi

Gabaix

2020

American Economic Review

184

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This paper develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents. We use a general behavioral framework that encompasses a wide range of behavioral biases such as misperceptions, internalities and mental accounting. We revisit the three pillars of optimal taxation: Ramsey (linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute), Pigou (linear commodity taxation to correct externalities) and Mirrlees (nonlinear income taxation). We show how the canonical optimal tax formulas are modified and lead to a rich set of novel economic insights. We also show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation frameworks, and jointly characterize optimal taxes and nudges. We explore the Diamond-Mirrlees productive efficiency result and the Atkinson-Stiglitz uniform commodity taxation proposition, and find that they are more likely to fail with behavioral agents. AbstractThis paper develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents. We use a general behavioral framework that encompasses a wide range of behavioral biases such as misperceptions, internalities and mental accounting. We revisit the three pillars of optimal taxation: Ramsey (linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute), Pigou (linear commodity taxation to correct externalities) and Mirrlees (nonlinear income taxation). We show how the canonical optimal tax formulas are modified and lead to a rich set of novel economic insights. We also show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation frameworks, and jointly characterize optimal taxes and nudges. We explore the Diamond-Mirrlees productive efficiency result and the Atkinson-Stiglitz uniform commodity taxation proposition, and find that they are more likely to fail with behavioral agents. (JEL: D03, H21).

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“…Some recent works have shown that preferences for redistribution differ between mobile and non-mobile individuals (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso 2017;Gugushvili 2016;Siedler and Sonnenberg 2013;Steele 2015), but they do not focus specifically on the effect of class mobility. Departing from previous studies, we use the diagonal reference model (Sobel 1981(Sobel , 1985 to examine the relative effect of social origin and destination classes on individual preferences for redistribution in a large sample of European countries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social mobility and demand for redistribution in Europe: a comparative analysis

Castillo

Marqués-Perales

2018

British Journal of Sociology

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The literature on preferences for redistribution has paid little attention to the effect of social mobility on the demand for redistribution and no systematic test of the hypotheses connecting social mobility and preferences for redistribution has yet been done to date. We use the diagonal reference model to estimate the effect of origin and destination classes on preferences for redistribution in a large sample of European countries using data from the European Social Survey. Our findings are consistent with the logic of acculturation in the sense that newcomers tend to adapt their views to those of the destination class at early stages and that upward and downward mobility do not have distinctive effects on the formation of political preferences. However, even though social origins seem to have a limited impact on preferences for redistribution, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that mobile and non-mobile individuals are alike. We also find that the effect of social origin on preferences varies largely across countries. The empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that the effect of social origin on preferences for redistribution increases in contexts of strong familism.

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Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution

Cited by 695 publications

References 63 publications

Meet the Oligarchs: Business Legitimacy, State Capacity and Taxation

Meet the Oligarchs: Business Legitimacy, State Capacity and Taxation

Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents

Social mobility and demand for redistribution in Europe: a comparative analysis

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