Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralised Public Spending

Bergvall, Daniel; Charbit, Claire; Kraan, Dirk-Jan; Merk, Olaf

doi:10.1787/budget-v5-art24-en

Cited by 73 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Countries have developed several approaches to contain the negative side effects of their intergovernmental transfer system (Bergvall et al, 2006;Blöchliger and Charbit, 2008). Their various approaches can be divided into 1) measures on the tax revenue side, 2) measures on the grant side, and 3) institutional measures, with the three groups sometimes overlapping.…”

Section: Box 2 Well-designed Grants: a Summarymentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxes or Grants

Blöchliger

Petzold

2009

OECD Economics Department Working Papers

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JT03267642This paper analyses trends in and driving forces of the revenue composition of sub-central governments (SCG). Between 1995 and 2005 the share of SCG in total government spending increased from 31 to 33%, while the SCG tax share remained stable at around 17%, increasing SCG's dependence on intergovernmental grants. While equal access to public services is the most common justification for such grants, the grant systems of most countries are much larger than required by equalization. Moreover, rather than smoothing out SCG revenue fluctuations over the cycle, grants often tend to exacerbate them. Finally, there is some evidence that grants reduce SCG tax raising effort, inflate SCG spending and increase SCG deficits and debt. The economic crisis will both sharply reduce SCG's own tax revenues and -via budget constraints at the central levelincrease pressure on the grant system. The crisis could hence help rethink the SCG revenue mix, their tax structure and the size and design of intergovernmental transfers. JEL classification: H42, H50, H77Keywords: Fiscal federalism; local taxation; intergovernmental grants +++++++++++++++ Impôts ou transferts : quels revenus pour les administrations infra-nationales ?Ce papier analyse les tendances et les déterminants de la composition des revenus des administrations infra-nationales (AI). Entre 1995 et 2005, la part des dépenses des AI dans les dépenses publiques totales a augmenté de 31 à 33%, alors que leur participation aux recettes fiscales restait stable autour de 17%, accentuant de ce fait la dépendance des AI envers les transferts intergouvernementaux. Bien que l'égalité d'accès aux services publics soit la raison la plus souvent invoquée pour justifier ces transferts, les systèmes de transferts sont en réalité souvent bien plus importants que ceux qu'impliquerait la simple péréquation. Par ailleurs, les transferts ont tendance à amplifier plutôt qu'à réduire les fluctuations de revenus au cours du cycle. Finalement, il semblerait que les transferts réduisent l'effort fiscal des AI tout en augmentant leurs dépenses et donc leurs déficits et leur dette. La crise économique en cours à la fois va réduire fortement les impôts propres des AI et -suite aux contraintes budgétaires au niveau centralaugmenter la pression sur le système des transferts. La crise pourrait donc inciter à repenser la composition des revenues des AI, la structure de leurs impôts et la taille et le design des transferts intergouvernementaux.

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Section: Box 2 Well-designed Grants: a Summarymentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxes or Grants

Blöchliger

Petzold

2009

OECD Economics Department Working Papers

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“…A conditional grant is beneficial if the expenditures of the recipient also benefit others and the recipient does not take these spillover benefits into account. For an overview of conditional intergovernmental grants and data on their importance see, e.g., Oates (1999), Bergvall, Charbit, Kraan, and Merk (2006), Huber and Runkel (2006), and Boadway and Shah (2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why not fully spend a conditional block grant?

Faber

Koning

2016

Int Tax Public Finance

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. This paper studies a conditional block grant that Dutch municipalities receive for welfare-towork programs. Many municipalities do not fully use this grant, although programs are beneficial for them. We argue that municipalities incur expenses to use the grant. If these costs are substantial, then it is optimal not to fully use the grant. Based on municipalityspecific data on grants and actual expenditures, we estimate that municipalities have to add about 90 cents from their own resources to spend 1 euro of the grant. As a result, the conditional block grant is de facto a closed-ended matching grant.JEL Classification: H77, H20, H71, I38

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“…На основе анализа различных теоретических и эмпирических исследований бюджетной децентрализации [5][6][7][8][9] обосновывается необходимость проведения дополнительной работы по улучшению качества данных и способов измерения фискальной децентрализации. Уровень децентрализации, определяемый стандартными показателями налоговой (доходной) и расходной бюджетной децентрализации (как доля расходов/доходов субнациональных бюджетов в консолидированном бюджете) в большинстве случаев не является адекватным отражением масштаба финансовой автономии субнациональных властей, что требует более продуманного и обоснованного подхода к его оценке.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Факторы Бюджетной Децентрализации На Региональном Уровне В России И США

Мамедов¹,

Авксентьев²,

Семенова³

2016

Russian JOurnal of Entrepreneurship

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Статья посвящена как изучению самого явления «децентрализации государственного управления» (в частности, поиску адекватного способа ее измерения), так и определению объясняющих его факторов на основе построения модели внутрирегиональной децентрализации и ее эконометрического оценивания (на примере регионов России и штатов США), что являлось конечной целью проведенного авторами исследования. Получение оценки степени децентрализации при этом можно рассматривать как первый шаг на пути достижения более важной цели – оценки влияния децентрализации на социально-экономическое развитие, рост реального сектора экономики в регионах, что будет являться предметом дальнейших исследований авторов.

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Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralised Public Spending

Cited by 73 publications

References 15 publications

Taxes or Grants

Taxes or Grants

Why not fully spend a conditional block grant?

Факторы Бюджетной Децентрализации На Региональном Уровне В России И США

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