Intermediaries in Two-Sided Markets: An Empirical Analysis of the US Cable Television Industry

Boik, Andre

doi:10.1257/mic.20140167

Cited by 16 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The empirical analysis is discussed in the following studies: "The literature on two-sided markets is developing rapidly" [26], the estimation of market power in the two-sided market for newspapers [4], the analysis of vertical restrictions taking into account entry in the magazine market [12], the estimation of market dominance in the game industry with a two-sided market nature [21], estimating the effects of newspaper market mergers that also take into account product characteristics [11], analyzing differentiation under a two-sided market based on the ideological nature of newspapers [13], and examining the effects of local television stations on the pricing behavior of intermediaries under the two-sided market nature of local television stations [6]. Other analyses have been conducted from a variety of perspectives.…”

Section: Previous Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business diversification and multifaceted markets

Arai

Hayashi

2021

IJEPS

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In this paper, we examine multiple segments, conventionally analyzed from the perspective of business diversification, from multiple perspectives in a multifaceted market. Specifically, based on segmental financial data, we conduct an empirical analysis of whether increased sales in the transportation business increase the profit margin of the real estate business of a railroad company. The results show that there are two types of sidedness among many businesses. The effects of both positive and negative indirect network effects were found to exist. In addition, verification of the difference-in-differences based on the initiation event of the mutual traffic interconnection demonstrates the indirect network effect in the transportation business to a certain extent, and shows that the effect is not uniform in each business, with some businesses showing strong effects and others showing less visible effects.

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Section: Previous Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business diversification and multifaceted markets

Arai

Hayashi

2021

IJEPS

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“…6 Some references in the growing literature on two-sided platforms as intermediaries include, e.g., Bernard and Jullien (2003), Evans (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006), Galeotti and Moraga-González (2009), Boik (2016).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring the Welfare of Intermediation in Vertical Markets

et al. 2018

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We empirically investigate the welfare implications of intermediaries in oligopolistic markets, where intermediaries offer additional services to differentiate their products from the ones of the manufacturers. Our identification strategy exploits the unique circumstance that, in the outdoors advertising industry, there are two distribution channels: consumers can purchase the product either directly from manufacturers, or through intermediaries. We specify a differentiated products' equilibrium model, and estimate it using product-level data for the whole industry. On the demand side, the model includes consumers who engage in costly search with preferences that are specific to the distribution channel. On the supply side, the model includes two competing distribution channels. One features two layers of activity, where manufacturers and intermediaries bargain over wholesale prices, and intermediaries compete on final prices to consumers. The other is vertically integrated. The estimated model is used to simulate counterfactual scenarios, where intermediaries do not offer additional services. We find that the presence of intermediaries increases welfare because the value of their services outweighs the additional margin charged.

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“…Consider Figure 4(a) from Boik (2016). Up until 2005, local U.S. television stations chose to charge a zero price to cable and satellite distributors for their content.…”

Section: Prediction and Identification With Negative Prices Or At A Zmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(a) Boik (2016) (b) Jin and Rysman (2015) Figure 4: (a) A time series of censored and then uncensored retransmission fees for local television station content, from Boik (2016). (b) Admission fees for baseball card conventions (which also charge a table fee to sellers) from Jin and Rysman (2015) .…”

Section: Prediction and Identification With Negative Prices Or At A Zmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prediction and Identification in Two-Sided Markets

Boik

2018

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Prediction and Identification in Two-Sided Markets Abstract I introduce a reduced form two-sided market model to study prediction and identification in two-sided markets. The model generates the hallmark features of two-sided markets: potentially below cost or even negative prices to one side of the market, and the "see-saw" or "waterbed" effect of a tendency for price movements across sides to be negatively correlated. I show that the standard "one-sided" model of complements is a special case of the two-sided model, and that it generates those same hallmark features of two-sided markets. The model of complements also performs well in predicting price effects even when the data is actually generated by the twosided market model; the "wrong" model often delivers the right answers and can be used to estimate market power and pass through rates. I show that even a naive one-sided model that ignores any relationship across goods/sides can perform well when prices to one side of the market are censored at zero, a very common outcome in two-sided markets. The main cost to using a model of complements to estimate cross-group effects in a two-sided market is that it invites the use of invalid instruments. I show that these findings are consistent with the empirical regularities and identification strategies in the existing two-sided market and indirect network effects literatures. I conclude by discussing the general difficulty of separately identifying whether price differences across subgroups of users of a platform are driven by pricing of network effects or simple price discrimination based on price elasticity. JEL-Codes: L000, L130. Terms of use: Documents in

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Intermediaries in Two-Sided Markets: An Empirical Analysis of the US Cable Television Industry

Cited by 16 publications

References 14 publications

Business diversification and multifaceted markets

Business diversification and multifaceted markets

Measuring the Welfare of Intermediation in Vertical Markets

Prediction and Identification in Two-Sided Markets

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