Internal Cocaine Trafficking and Armed Violence in Colombia

Abstract

This paper exploits time variations in international cocaine prices and potential trafficking routes within Colombia to estimate the effect of the illegal cocaine trade on changes in municipality homicide rates. I construct the potential internal cocaine‐trafficking network and exploit the fact that different regions in Colombia have comparative advantages in serving different international markets. My results suggest that when cocaine prices increase in either the United States or Europe, homicide rates increase in municipalities strategically placed to serve each international market. (JEL D74, K42, F19)

Peacemaking through the lens of participation: Revisiting the 2016 Colombian peace accord

“…Meanwhile, armed actors defend the interests of narcotraffickers who perform brutish acts to protect their coca crops and smuggling routes and compete with others (Millán‐Quijano, 2019). Furthermore, armed wings of rightist groups linked with large landowners organize security schemes to conserve or expand the ownership of their patrons' lands.…”

Peer Effects and Recidivism: Wartime Connections and Criminality among Colombian Ex-Combatants

“…1 The effect of a commodity price shock will depend on many factors, including whether the commodity is legal or illegal, capital or labor intensive, or seasonal or not. 2 There is evidence that changes in the economic returns to the production and distribution of illegal commodities are associated with crime and violence (Dell 2015;Dube and Vargas 2013;Mejia and Restrepo 2013;Millán-Quijano 2020;Sviatschi 2022). When illegal profits change, rates of criminality also change, for example, because of variations in market 1 For a review of crime and economic incentives, see Draca and Machin (2015) and Ferraz, Soares, and Vargas (2021).…”

Cultivation and competition in Colombia: Disentangling the effects of coca price changes on violence

“…Brokers in Latin America started playing an increasingly important role in supplying these international traffickers with bulk quantities of HCI, which they obtained from Colombian groups. The increasingly fragmented market and presence of brokers caused the bargaining power of guerillas and paramilitaries involved in the coca sector to deteriorate, turning the latter into price takers (Millán‐Quijano, 2020; UNODC & Europol, 2021). Especially the BACRIM faced a competitive environment in which they had less bargaining power: In many areas where the AUC was initially present, “two or more emerging criminal bands with no obvious relationship and often exhibiting an environment of mutual tensions and retaliations would occupy the vacated space” (Saab & Taylor, 2009, p. 463).…”