Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony Redux

Abstract

Abstract:In general, epistemic internalists hold that an individual's justification for a belief is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons for thinking that the contents of her beliefs are true. Applying this to the epistemology of testimony, a hearer's justification for beliefs acquired through testimony is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons to think that the contents of the speaker's testimony is true. A consequence of internalism is that subjects that are alike with respect to their reflectively accessible reasons are alike with respect to what they have justification to believe. Testimony should be thought no different: hearers that are alike with respect to reflectively accessible reasons to think that a speaker's testimony is true are alike with respect to their justification for beliefs based upon that testimony. But it has been recently argued that this view faces powerful counterexamples (Wright, 2015).So the central question is this: assuming that a hearer can acquire justification to believe a proposition through the testimony of a speaker, can epistemic internalism provide the resources to explain how such justification is possible? My aim in this paper is to address these counterexamples, and in so doing, defend epistemic internalist accounts of testimony.

Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification

“…Natural testimony, unlike formal testimony which can be found in, for example, the courtroom, "is to be encountered in such everyday circumstances as exhibit the 'social operations of mind': giving someone directions to the post ofce, reporting what happened in an accident, saying that, yes, you have seen a child answering to that description, telling someone the result of the last race of the last cricket score" (Coady 1992: 38). 3 Proponents of TJ internalism include Fricker (1994Fricker ( , 2006, Fumerton (2006), Lehrer (2006), and Madison (2016). Moreover, there are different views about what having internal reasons for considering the speaker's testimony true amounts to.…”

“…The first two objections have also been responded to by Brent Madison (2016). For that reason, I will not spend too much time defending my argument against them.…”

“…For example, by claiming that justification is warrant, Wright is committed to the view that justified true belief is sufficient for knowledge. However, as Madison (2016: 747) rightfully points out, in the aftermath of Edmund Gettier's (1963) counterexamples, it is clear that the tripartite analysis of knowledge intuitively fails 16 . We therefore have good reason to reject Wright's claim that justification is warrant, and with it the claim that Barry and Larry differ in terms of testimonial justification too.…”

“…The proponent of TJ internalism can affirm that justification is connected with knowledge because it is a necessary condition of it (cf. Madison 2016: 747–8). Indeed, not only is this the standard internalist view, 18 it also doesn't devalue justification.…”

“…3Proponents of TJ internalism include Fricker (1994, 2006), Fumerton (2006), Lehrer (2006), and Madison (2016). Moreover, there are different views about what having internal reasons for considering the speaker's testimony true amounts to.…”