International Competition for Multinational Investment

Haaland, Jan I.; Wooton, Ian

doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00177

Cited by 66 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 8 publications

(9 reference statements)

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“…Head et al (2001) even argue that competition between host governments may render incentives ineffective as they offset each other. Also, this form of competition for FDI may have impacted on the distribution of incentives and is highly likely to have redistributed income from host countries to MNEs, see Haaland and Wooton (1999).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?

Görg¹,

Greenaway²

2016

World Scientific Studies in International Economics

177

214

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor, (2) internationalization of labor markets, (3) welfare state and labor market, (4) labor markets in transition countries, (5) the future of labor, (6) evaluation of labor market policies and projects and (7) general labor economics. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion.Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available on the IZA website (www.iza.org) or directly from the author. Governments the world over offer significant inducements to attract inward investment, motivated by the expectation of spillover benefits to augment the primary benefits of a boost to national income from new investment. This paper begins by reviewing possible sources of FDI induced spillovers. It then provides a comprehensive evaluation of the empirical evidence on productivity, wages and exports spillovers in developing, developed and transitional economies. Although theory can identify a range of possible spillover channels, robust empirical support for positive spillovers is, at best, mixed. The reasons for this are explored and the paper concludes with a review of policy aspects.JEL Classification: F21, F23

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?

Görg¹,

Greenaway²

2016

World Scientific Studies in International Economics

177

214

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“…21 Ethier (1998) in a theory of regionalism takes the enforcement issue also as exogenous and provides additional reasons that apply in our case, too. We are mainly interested in the analysis of partial MAI.…”

Section: De Ning Equilibrium Of Subgame With Exogenous Mai Rulementioning

confidence: 85%

“…The MAI was planned to become legally binding by incorporating it into national law and opening the doors of national courts to MNEs to sue governments for their policies and regulatory takings that con?ict with the MAI provisions. 21 …”

Section: Modelling Maimentioning

confidence: 99%

A Theoretical Perspective on Multilateral Agreements on Investment*

Turrini

Urban²

2008

Rev International Economics

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This study provides a rationale for a multilateral investment agreement (MAI), an explanation of its obstacles in implementation, and a description of its welfare implications with particular focus on least developed countries (LDCs). A MAI negotiated by a club of governments with heterogeneous objectives reduces a time inconsistency problem of rent extraction from MNEs by governments but constitutes an information externality on non-members. At the same time, it is instable, and a regime emerges where there are many di-erent agreements comparable to bilateral investment treaties (BITs). However, an appropriately designed MAI is world-welfare improving compared to a regime of BITs by alleviating a political economy distortion.

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“…5 Haaland and Wooton (1999) and Haufler and Wooton (1999) study tax competition for FDI in the presence of geographical advantages such as proximity to a large market or to a pool of suppliers or workers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subsidy competition and the mode of FDI

Albornoz

Corcos

Kendall

2009

Regional Science and Urban Economics

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We model subsidy competition for a foreign MNC's investment in two trading partners. Taking into account acquisitions as an alternative investment mode weakens the case for subsidising greenfield investment. Competition between countries results in welfare losses, which are reinforced by positive externalities from the MNC's presence and regional integration. The results also apply to situations where the acquisition price accounts for the possibility of subsidies and when governments use acquisition subsidies as an alternative to greenfield subsidies. JEL-Classification: F15, F21, F23

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International Competition for Multinational Investment

Cited by 66 publications

References 8 publications

Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?

Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?

A Theoretical Perspective on Multilateral Agreements on Investment*

Subsidy competition and the mode of FDI

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