Studies in this article support the peace-building effects of interest similarity, and we have to re-evaluate the current world peace through a new lens of interest. Previous research has informed us that states with similar security and/or economic interests will experience fewer conflict onsets. This study begins with research treating interest similarity as a ''facilitating condition for conflict,'' and argues that in addition to security interest, capitalist economic policies that lead to the deeper integration of an economy into international markets should be considered one of the ultimate driving forces of peace. By discussing a brief description of bilateral peace in the China-Taiwan dyad, this article concludes that the ChinaTaiwan dyad has less possibility of encountering military conflict if both governments can maintain similarity in their security interests. Moreover, the author distinguishes different models in capitalist peace theory, which include the free-market and the social-market. Accordingly, this article examines three different prestigious capitalist models: trade, capital openness, and contract-intensive economy as socialmarket theory. The results suggest that the China-Taiwan case is an appropriate case for the trade (Weede, Economic development, social order, and world politics, 1996) and capital openness models (Gartzke, Am J Polit Sci 51(1): 2007). Future studies need to be more aware of the model chosen for capitalist peace on cross-Strait relations.