International environmental agreements on climate protection: A Binary choice model with heterogeneous agents

International Environmental Agreements When Countries Behave Morally

“…The robustness of this pessimistic result has been examined in various different extensions of the canonical model. Among these extensions are modesty on the part of the coalition (Finus and Maus 2008), adaptation and mitigation (Bayramoglu et al 2018), ancilliary effects (Finus and Rübbelke 2013), inequality aversion (Lange and Vogt 2003, Vogt 2016), altruism (van der Pol et al 2012) and reciprocity (Nyborg 2018b andBuchholz et al 2018). Furthermore, Pethig (2013, 2015) The second strand our paper contributes to is the small literature on Kantian economics.…”

Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Altruistic Preferences

“…These theories have also been applied in the literature on self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Buchholz et al (2018) and Nyborg (2018) analyse the effects of reciprocal fairness when countries decide on their membership in the coalition and on their emissions. They find that reciprocal fairness can stabilise the grand coalition, but it can also stabilise an interior coalition that is either weakly larger (Nyborg 2018) or even weakly smaller (Buchholz et al 2018) than the interior coalition without reciprocal fairness.…”

“…Buchholz et al (2018) and Nyborg (2018) analyse the effects of reciprocal fairness when countries decide on their membership in the coalition and on their emissions. They find that reciprocal fairness can stabilise the grand coalition, but it can also stabilise an interior coalition that is either weakly larger (Nyborg 2018) or even weakly smaller (Buchholz et al 2018) than the interior coalition without reciprocal fairness. Lange and Vogt (2003) incorporate inequality aversion à la Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) into the canonical model of self-enforcing international environmental agreements and find that sufficiently large inequality aversion can stabilise the grand coalition.…”

Altruistic Foreign Aid and Climate Change Mitigation

“…The main take-away from this literature is the under-provision of global public goods, whether through voluntary provision or formal coalitions. However, it has been shown that this provision may be increased via different aspects, such as technological change and uncertainty (e.g., Barrett 2006;Boucher and Bramoullé 2010), countries heterogeneity and side payments (e.g., Barrett 2001;McGinty 2007), or social preferences such as altruism, fairness, or reciprocity (e.g., Buchholz et al 2018;Nyborg 2018;Lange and Vogt 2003;van der Pol et al 2012). Unlike these papers, in which the improvement of global public good provision is usually shown through a change in the organization of formal coalitions, the mechanism we propose allows us to solve the coordination problem without requiring formal cooperation.…”