International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries: Climate Clubs vs. Global Cooperation

Hagen, Achim; Eisenack, Klaus

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2621328

Cited by 2 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Going beyond numerical examples, Hagen and Eisenack (2015) study the effect of multiple coexisting climate clubs in an analytical game theoretic setting. The paper allows for asymmetric countries and investigates if global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if countries can form coexisting TEAs.…”

Section: Climate Clubsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As shown by Hagen and Eisenack (2015) linear benefits of abatement always lead to dominant abatement strategies, while other cost and benefit structures from emissions abatement may lead to non-dominant reaction functions. In the extreme case of linear costs and concave benefits from abatement, only one agreement would undertake emissions abatement while all other countries do not abate any emissions regardless of their potential membership in other agreements.…”

Section: Climate Clubsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Studies that admit for multiple climate clubs are sparse (e.g. Asheim et al, 2006;Finus, 2008;Hagen and Eisenack, 2015). National lobby groups are addressed by Dietz et al (2012), Habla and Winkler (2013) and Altamirano-Cabrera et al (2007), but not from a transnational perspective (for a literature review on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements see Wangler et al, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Transnational environmental agreements with heterogeneous actors

Hagen¹,

Kähler²,

Eisenack³

2017

Economics of International Environmental Agreements

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper explores transnational environmental agreements on climate change. As the Paris agreement of 2015 contains no binding emission reduction targets for nation states, understanding other forms of cooperation as complements to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process becomes increasingly important. We thus aim to identify directions for further research on agreements with heterogeneous contracting parties. By building on empirical examples of emerging transnational environmental agreements, and on insights from the global governance literature, we discuss the scope and limits of the current economic literature on international environmental agreements. We argue that further game theoretical research would benefit from extending the analysis (i) to consider actors that are not nation state governments, and (ii) to consider multiple environmental agreements that are in force at the same time. We underpin this claim by suggesting two proposals for economic models that analyze climate clubs and city alliances. The results show that transnational environmental agreements can be individually rational and can improve the effectiveness of climate policies.

show abstract

Section: Climate Clubsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Climate Clubsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Transnational environmental agreements with heterogeneous actors

Hagen¹,

Kähler²,

Eisenack³

2017

Economics of International Environmental Agreements

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…7 Osmani and Tol (2010) extend the model of Barrett (1994a) to allow for asymmetric countries and two selfenforcing IEAs and show that when the number of countries is few and environmental damage is high, two IEAs are more effective than one at reducing emissions and increasing welfare. More recently, Hagen and Eisenack (2015) show that, in the two-stage IEA membership game with asymmetric countries, the possibility of multiple coalitions increases the number of cooperating countries and total abatement under constant marginal benefits from abatement. However, if the marginal benefits are decreasing, the number of coalitions does not affect total emissions.…”

Section: Static Membership Games (Full Information)mentioning

confidence: 99%

International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature

Marrouch

Chaudhuri

2016

IRERE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We survey the economics literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We classify the extant literature into the following categories: pure IEA games without linkages, which focus on a single externality stemming from global pollution; IEA games with side payments and issue linkages, which consider carrot or stick mechanisms to lure cooperators or punish defectors; political economy models, which examine intra-and intergovernmental issues that affect international negotiations; design issues of IEAs; behavioral factors, which affect the willingness of countries to cooperate; and additional externalities resulting from open economy issues and adaptation, which interact with the global pollution externality and affect the free-riding incentives of countries. Based on this classification of the literature, we attempt to identify conditions under which an * We would like to thank Rita Antar for her excellent research assistance. We appreciate insightful comments by two anonymous reviewers and the editors.

show abstract

International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries: Climate Clubs vs. Global Cooperation

Abstract: We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be

Cited by 2 publications

References 20 publications

Transnational environmental agreements with heterogeneous actors

Transnational environmental agreements with heterogeneous actors

International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About