International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability

Born, Hans; Leigh, Ian; Wills, Aidan

doi:10.4324/9780203831731

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…The SWIFT and PRISM cases show that the distinction between internal and external security becomes increasingly difficult to draw (Burgess, ). Moreover, threats to security have become increasingly transnational in nature as well as increasingly networked and thus dispersed (Born et al ., ).…”

Section: Eu Executive Secrecy: Euci Rules and Practicementioning

confidence: 97%

Overseeing Secrets in the EU: A Democratic Perspective

Curtin

2014

J of Common Market Studies

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Formulating policy and overseeing implementation require access to information. Yet in (national) security matters executive officials have considerable discretion to conceal from the public and from parliaments information they consider sensitive. If executive officials are given largely unchecked power to conceal from the public and from parliament(s) whatever information they consider sensitive, part of the essential machinery of democracy is disconnected. Secrecy becomes a danger when it undermines the very values invoked to protect it: democratic self-government and security. Technical European Union (EU) security classification rules receive little attention from outsiders and are adopted and amended in iterative processes as low-level internal rule-making. Oversight mechanisms in the EU, in particular by parliaments, can supply some countervailing pressure, but remain a recurrent challenge. Is more public discussion needed on when and for how long secrets can be kept and how oversight mechanisms are constructed in new EU horizontal legislation?

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Section: Eu Executive Secrecy: Euci Rules and Practicementioning

confidence: 97%

Overseeing Secrets in the EU: A Democratic Perspective

Curtin

2014

J of Common Market Studies

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“…For that matter, the issue of whether intelligence and security sources have to be credible evidence in ordinary criminal litigation is highly debatable (Voorhout, 2005;Vervaele, 2005;Forcese & Waldman, 2007;Born et al, 2011). Obviously, it is irrefutable thatgiven the present-day complexity of the threat of terrorismthe work of gathering intelligence and prosecuting alleged perpetrators of the crime are becoming the two sides of a coin both in the preventive and retributive aspects of countering terrorism.…”

Section: Specific Powers Of the Niss In The Prevention And Counteringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unchecked Powers of the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service in the Prevention and Countering of Terrorist Crimes: Some Disquiets at a Glimpse

Belete

2018

ESJ

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This article questions the supreme role of the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) in the prevention and countering of alleged terrorist acts vis-à-vis its institutional legitimacy and operational integrity. With no exception to other states, Ethiopia also re-established the National Intelligence and Security Service in 2013 but as a sole and unique institution of its kind with multiplex mandates both on general and specific intelligence and security matters. Having in mind the more sensitive powers conferred to the institution and its unrivalled authority in masterminding all the preventive and punitive measures against alleged terrorist conducts as enshrined under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of the country, this article examines whether the establishing proclamation has set the required normative standards and watchdogging institutional platforms to ensure its functional accountability. After investigating the Service’s organizational structure, the public, judicial and political watchdogging apparatuses, the lack of administrative and financial transparency, as well as the alleged alliance of the institution to the regime in power, this article submits that the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service lacks the key attributes of a politically independent and functionally autonomous institution that strives to protect the nation’s politico-economic and security interests. As it stands, much of the Services’s mission rather appears to have been constricted to serving as an untouchable guardian of the party or the regime in power, or as a rising unique entity that roams on its own impervious orbit.

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“…152 It has been described as: 'the most jealously protected national security privilege of all'. 153 Neither should the dichotomy between civil and criminal procedure necessarily be seen as a reason to avoid binding legal standards of procedural fairness. The civil/criminal divide is necessarily present in this context because the 1267 regime forms part of a system of 'preventive justice', discussed above.…”

Section: An Alternative Conception Of Judicial Review Of Security Powersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Between Power and Process: Legal and Political Control over (Inter)national Security †

Hooper

2018

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

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Securing fair procedures in the realm of (inter)national security has historically been much more difficult than in other realms of administration. It is necessary to steer a course between the national and the international, and law and politics. Any conception of the relationship between these forums and values will have different consequences, for both institutions tasked with the protection of security, and for persons affected by sanctions. This review of Devika Hovell's The Power of Process: The Value of Due Process in Security Council Sanctions Decision-Making argues that the presence of binding legal rulings against the exercise of such power remains an essential complement to innovative political forms of control such as an international Ombudsperson.

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International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Overseeing Secrets in the EU: A Democratic Perspective

Overseeing Secrets in the EU: A Democratic Perspective

Unchecked Powers of the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service in the Prevention and Countering of Terrorist Crimes: Some Disquiets at a Glimpse

Between Power and Process: Legal and Political Control over (Inter)national Security †

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