International investors’ reactions to cross-border acquisitions by emerging market multinationals

Abstract

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The impact of leadership on organizational ambidexterity and employee psychological safety in the global acquisitions of emerging market multinationals

“…The extant literature has identified the motivations and means for the internationalization of these EMMs (Boateng, Qian & Tianle, 2008;Zhang, Zhou & Ebbers, 2011;Kohli & Mann, 2012;Wang, Hong, Kafouros & Boateng, 2012;Huang & Renyong, 2014;Ning, Kuo, Strange & Wang, 2014). We chose Indian and Chinese companies as they belong to two of the largest emerging economies in the world that are institutionally diverse.…”

Post-Acquisition Control in Cross-Border Acquisition of Chinese Enterprises Base on the Institutional Theory

“…The institutional factors, which are made up of regulatory, normative and cognitive, form the concept of what kind of business behavior is legal in the enterprise field, and then form institutional pressure to drive the enterprise to make decisions in accordance with the requirements of external legitimacy [4], resulting in organization isomorphism The uncertainty of the decision-making environment is the main cause of the organization isomorphism [5]. Companies in an uncertain environment are going to imitate other companies, especially the industry leader, to obtain external recognition, even if such external imitation is uneconomical [6]. The greater the degree of uncertainty, the higher the degree of decision makers based on social references to make decisions.…”

Do corporate governance and culture matter in cross-border acquisitions? Some Chinese evidence

“…Second and to the contrary, Du and Boateng (2015) find that the Chinese government's ownership and shareholders' wealth correlate positively because of the affirmative signals sent by policy-driven turnaround of targets and fewer financial restrictions because of implicit governmental guarantees. Also, most Chinese SOEs are cross-listed abroad, and those firms show higher shareholder value (Ghosh & He, 2015) because they are believed to maintain higher managerial transparency under the regulatory umbrella of foreign authorities (Ning et al, 2014). Choi and Choi (2015) show that Korean firms that have cross-listed their American depositary receipts are better-governed than other firms, lending support to Coffee's (1999) bonding hypothesis.…”

“…Boateng et al (2008), Kling and Weitzel (2011), Ning et al (2014), and Du and Boateng (2015) report positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Chinese shareholders upon the announcement of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. However, Chen and Young (2010) document negative event-study returns for 39 international merger cases involving Chinese SOEs.…”

“…First, Chen and Young (2010), Ning et al (2014), and Kling and Weitzel (2011) argue that the shareholders of Chinese SOEs on average see their wealth decline when their firms acquire overseas targets because their government shareholder might make decisions from political motives at the expense of minority and individual shareholders' agency costs. Second and to the contrary, Du and Boateng (2015) find that the Chinese government's ownership and shareholders' wealth correlate positively because of the affirmative signals sent by policy-driven turnaround of targets and fewer financial restrictions because of implicit governmental guarantees.…”