International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective

Doxey, Margaret

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-25016-5

Cited by 66 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…2 2 See Doxey (1980, 1987), Gilpin (1984), Mayall (1984), Martin (1992), and Haass (1997, 1998) on the need to form a multilateral sanctioning coalition in order for sanctions to be successful. See Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1999), Drezner (2000), and Miers and Morgan (2002) on the potential problems faced by sanctioning coalitions. …”

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confidence: 99%

Investment, Opportunity, and Risk: Do US Sanctions Deter or Encourage Global Investment?¹

Lektzian

Biglaiser

2012

Int Stud Q

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Complementing the effectiveness of US sanctions debate, the US government often prods US investors to disinvest from targeted countries, hoping to pressure sanctioned countries to back US foreign policy goals or face economic costs for their actions. Missing from the effectiveness of sanctions debate is the impact US sanctions have on third-party foreign direct investment (FDI). Using panel data for 171 countries from 1969 to 2000, we present the first empirical study on the effect of sanctions on global FDI. We find strong evidence that when US firms disinvest during US sanctions, global FDI significantly increases, providing the target country with a reliable source of capital replacement. The results suggest the limited effectiveness of sanctions for restricting capital flows to targeted countries and that US firms may ultimately bear the highest costs from US-imposed sanctions.

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confidence: 99%

Investment, Opportunity, and Risk: Do US Sanctions Deter or Encourage Global Investment?¹

Lektzian

Biglaiser

2012

Int Stud Q

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“…A conflict expectations model can explain the dynamics of economic coercion with more accuracy and parsimony than other theories. A major problem with the existing literature is that theories are developed from just one or two well-publicized cases of economic sanctions (Galtung, 1967;Hoffman, 1967;Schreiber, 1973;Losman, 1979;Renwick, 1981;Doxey, 1987). The very celebrity of these cases suggests they are atypical, that they stand out in some unusual way.…”

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confidence: 99%

Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion

Drezner

1998

Int Studies Q

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Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions or what determines their success. These events are often explained away as "symbolic politics" driven completely by domestic-level factors. This article develops a simple game-theoretic model of economic coercion to show that both "senders" and "targets" of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behavior. Conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect on coercion events. First, senders that anticipate frequent conflicts will be more willing to initiate economic coercion, even if such attempts are costly. Senders that anticipate few conflicts will not threaten sanctions unless they incur minimal costs and the target would suffer significantly. While a robust anticipation of future disputes might make the sender prefer a coercive strategy, it also reduces its ability to obtain concessions. Target states that anticipate frequent conflict with the sender will make fewer concessions. Ironically, a sender will obtain the most favorable distribution of payoffs when it cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. These hypotheses are tested statistically, with the results strongly supporting the conflict expectations model.In 1990, the United States convinced the United Nations Security Council to impose stringent economic sanctions against Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. These sanctions achieved the greatest degree of international cooperation in modern history and cost Iraq half of its GNP in lost trade. The Iraqi regime refused to back down, however, and force was needed to restore Kuwaiti independence.In 1991, the United States threatened to withhold loan guarantees from Israel unless that country agreed to halt the construction of new housing in the West Bank and attend a multilateral peace conference in Madrid. Unlike the Iraqi case, in this episode the United States acted alone, without much fanfare, and against the wishes of an active domestic lobby. The costs of the sanctions to Israel were significant but far lower than in the Iraqi case. Yet in the end the Israelis acquiesced.Why were the outcomes so different? More generally, under what conditions will a sanctioning country (called the sender) attempt economic coercion? What determines the magnitude of the concessions made by the sanctioned country (called the target)?International Studies Quarterly (1998) 42, 709-731

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“…If they perceive the future as conflictual, they are more likely to use economic sanctions in the current dispute (Drezner 1998). The consideration of future and especially current relations with the target when deciding to impose economic sanctions is in line with the economic sanction literature, which emphasizes international reasons for economic sanction use (Doxey 1971;Barber 1979;Renwick 1981;Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990a). As mentioned above, most studies of economic sanctions base the sanction goals or reasons for use on relations with the target.…”

Section: Economic Sanction Usementioning

confidence: 66%

“…In the 1980 election, Ronald Reagan promised farmers hurt by the grain embargo against the Soviet Union that he would reverse President Jimmy Carter's policy and lift the embargo. Clearly, Reagan was not soft on communism, but he saw the importance of the farmers and their lobby in the upcoming election (Doxey 1987). Similarly in 1992, Clinton campaigned to the right of Bush in Florida, claiming that he would be harder on Fidel Castro than the previous administration (Fisk 2000).…”

Section: Economic Sanction Usementioning

confidence: 99%

U.S. Presidents and the Use of Economic Sanctions

Drury

2000

Pres Stud Q

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What conditions lead the U. S. president to use and alter economic sanctions? Both relations with the target country and domestic politics are considered as conditions leading to the employment and later removal of economic sanctions. Using time‐series cross‐sectional data, the analysis shows that the president considers both the relations with the target country and U. S. domestic factors when deciding to impose economic sanctions, although the relations with the target have a much greater impact on the decision. Once the economic sanctions are in place and the president must decide to maintain or alter them, the domestic political influence disappears, and the president considers only the relations with the target when modifying sanction policy.

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International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective

Cited by 66 publications

References 0 publications

Investment, Opportunity, and Risk: Do US Sanctions Deter or Encourage Global Investment?¹

Investment, Opportunity, and Risk: Do US Sanctions Deter or Encourage Global Investment?¹

Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion

U.S. Presidents and the Use of Economic Sanctions

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International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective

Cited by 66 publications

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Investment, Opportunity, and Risk: Do US Sanctions Deter or Encourage Global Investment?1

Investment, Opportunity, and Risk: Do US Sanctions Deter or Encourage Global Investment?1

Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion

U.S. Presidents and the Use of Economic Sanctions

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Resources

About

Investment, Opportunity, and Risk: Do US Sanctions Deter or Encourage Global Investment?¹

Investment, Opportunity, and Risk: Do US Sanctions Deter or Encourage Global Investment?¹