International Scrutiny and Pre-Electoral Fiscal Manipulation in Developing Countries

Hyde, Susan D.; O’Mahony, Angela

doi:10.1017/s0022381610000101

Cited by 53 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…It retains 5 Hallerberg 2004, 220-1. 6 Dai 2002; on international scrutiny see Hyde and O'Mahony 2010. that meaning in the fiscal context. Gimmicks are a variety of more or less deliberate attempts by governments to improve the appearance of their public finance statistics (like budget balance and debt) through actions that have no substantive effect on their real underlying fiscal position.…”

Section: Theory and Measurement Of Gimmicksmentioning

confidence: 99%

It Isn't Just about Greece: Domestic Politics, Transparency and Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe

Alt¹,

Lassen²,

Wehner³

2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

108

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We analyze the political origins of differences in adherence to the fiscal framework of the European Union. We show how incentives to use fiscal policy for electoral purposes and limited budget transparency at the national level, combined with the need to respond to fiscal rules at the supranational level, interact to produce systematic undermining of the Economic and Monetary Union through employment of fiscal gimmicks or creative accounting. We also identify in detail how manipulation of national accounts was used to produce electoral cycles under the radar of the budget surveillance system of the EU, and conclude with new perspectives on the changes to and challenges for euro area fiscal rules.

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Section: Theory and Measurement Of Gimmicksmentioning

confidence: 99%

It Isn't Just about Greece: Domestic Politics, Transparency and Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe

Alt¹,

Lassen²,

Wehner³

2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

108

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“…Since scal austerity has been a widespread corollary of IMF conditionality, IMF agreements are expected to limit a government's ability to contract new debt and hike up the decit (Hyde and O'Mahony, 2010). We use an updated version of Dreher (2006) to obtain the data.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Constraints, competition, and competitiveness: explaining the non-linear effect of democratization on political budget cycles

Eibl

Lynge-Mangueira

2016

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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The literature on political budget cycles (PBCs) does not offer a full-fledged theory about the effect of democratization. However, it does imply a non-linear effect along the regime spectrum: positive at the autocratic end, negative at the democratic end. We theoretically develop and empirically test this implication by pointing to two countervailing effects of democratization:executive constraintsandpolitical competition. While the former contains PBCs, the latter stimulates them. Because of their empirical covariation, PBCs occur primarily in hybrid regimes where the decision-making powers of the executive are relatively unrestricted and politics is relatively competitive. We also show that while executive constraints and political competition condition PBCs, what triggers the fluctuations iselectoral competitiveness. Only when incumbents fear electoral defeat, do they create PBCs. The study is based on novel data on public spending in 112 countries, covering the entire regime spectrum over the period from 1960 to 2006.

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“…However, election fraud is only part of the story. Major vote fraud is more difficult to execute in the presence of today's ubiquitous elections monitors, who gain access to all but the most closed regimes (Hyde and O'Mahony 2010). Thus, ballot-rigging rarely sways the electoral results by more than a few percentage points (Dominguez and McCann 1998;Lehoucq and Jimenez 2002;Lehoucq 2003) and is more often employed just enough to ensure victory in regimes with real competitors (Donno and Roussias 2012).…”

Section: Strategies For Managing Oppositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan

LaPorte

2014

Post-Soviet Affairs

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This paper examines the consolidation and maintenance of hegemonic authoritarianism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Hegemonic regimes are characterized by their nearly total lack of political competition. Despite the presence of opposition parties and regular elections, the incumbent in these cases is reelected with 70% or more of the vote. What does it take to sustain overwhelming margins of victory in regular elections in the face of institutionalized opposition? Previous studies have suggested that either violent repression or institutionalized co-optation of opposition groups is central to securing long-term hegemonic regime stability. These mechanisms explain how rulers forestall potential opposition. Upon coming to power in 1993, however, Heydar Aliyev -like many post-Soviet leaders -inherited a genuine, existing opposition in the Popular Front movement. I suggest that in the presence of an intractable opposition, Azerbaijan's rulers have taken a different approach with regard to regime maintenance. Drawing on over 50 original interviews conducted during 6 months of field research, I identify the mechanisms by which the government has "hidden the opposition in plain sight" by making it effectively difficult for existing opposition groups to function as credible political parties. Since the mid-1990s, the Aliyev regime has used informal measures to prevent these groups from aggregating and articulating the diverse interests present in society from visibly competing in elections and from serving effectively in government to craft and implement policy. These practices have rendered the opposition technically legal, but completely ineffective. Besides weakening the opposition, these measures produce a series of mutually reinforcing effects -including noncompetitive elections by default and a politically disengaged society -that sustain long term regime stability. The paper concludes by examining this argument in comparative perspective. Hegemonic regimes have proliferated in the post-Soviet region, and I suggest that this strategy is an important factor in sustaining many of these regimes.

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International Scrutiny and Pre-Electoral Fiscal Manipulation in Developing Countries

Cited by 53 publications

References 40 publications

It Isn't Just about Greece: Domestic Politics, Transparency and Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe

It Isn't Just about Greece: Domestic Politics, Transparency and Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe

Constraints, competition, and competitiveness: explaining the non-linear effect of democratization on political budget cycles

Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan

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