International Side-payments to Improve Global Public Good Provision when Transfers are Refinanced through a Tax on Local and Global Externalities

Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin; Markandya, Anil; Rübbelke, Dirk

doi:10.1080/10168737.2012.759986

Cited by 14 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…For example, the burning of fossil fuels generates carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), sulphur dioxide (SO 2 ), and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions. As a result, there could be significant co-benefits between GHG emissions mitigation and pollutant emissions reduction (Altemeyer-Bartscher et al, 2013;Buchholz et al, 2020). Policies or measures to reduce environmental pollution often produce ancillary effects for climate change mitigation and vice versa (Markandya and Rübbelke, 2012;Nemet et al, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sweet spots are in the food system: Structural adjustments to co-control regional pollutants and national GHG emissions in China

Liu

Liang

Creutzig

et al. 2020

Ecological Economics

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The Chinese government aims to mitigate climate change while also reducing local air pollution; this requires cocontrol of greenhouse gases and pollutants. Here, we develop a method combining an elasticity analysis and a multi-regional input-output model, to measure changes in the emissions of greenhouse gases and pollutants and corresponding socio-economic costs caused by the adjustments in intermediate input, inter-regional trade, and final demand transactions for 30 provinces in China. A filter framework is proposed to identify the key structural transactions that can significantly co-control both emission types with small socio-economic impacts. The results show that 13 effective co-control spots can simultaneously reduce greenhouse gases and pollutants. Among these, eight co-controls are associated with low economic costs, which we refer to as 'sweet spots'. Sweet spots cover agricultural inputs in the food and tobacco sectors of Inner Mongolia, Sichuan, Liaoning, and Hubei; selfinputs in the agriculture of Henan; self-inputs in the food and tobacco sector of Shandong; fixed capital formation of agriculture in Hebei; and urban household consumption of agricultural products in Guangdong. This finding is important, as climate measures mostly side-line the agricultural sector so far, both in China and in other parts of the world.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sweet spots are in the food system: Structural adjustments to co-control regional pollutants and national GHG emissions in China

Liu

Liang

Creutzig

et al. 2020

Ecological Economics

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“…Markandya and Rübbelke 2004), and in particular in conjunction with side-payments or tax transfers (e.g. Altemeyer-Bartscher et al 2011;Markandya and Rübbelke 2012;Altemeyer-Bartscher et al 2014). 3 Other contributions in the area of global externalities and taxation 4 evaluate the effects of labour mobility (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Altruism and Global Environmental Taxes

Daube

2018

Environ Resource Econ

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A global externality like the GHG emissions leading to climate change are both due to free-riding at the individual level as well as the government level. A government aiming to maximise domestic social welfare may make individuals internalise the damage within their country, but will free-ride on the damage caused to other countries. Only a global cooperative solution could internalise global damage entirely. If individuals have altruistic concern for others but continue to believe that their consumption is negligible relative to the total, they will not change their behaviour. However, this paper shows that in a multi-country setting the global equilibrium levels of consumption for both the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are affected by altruism. The key results are (a) that non-cooperative governments maximising domestic welfare will internalise some of the damage inflicted on other countries depending on the level of altruistic concern individuals have, and (b) the cooperative global optimum also changes as altruism leads individuals to effectively experience damage in other countries as well as the direct damage to them. Since altruistic concern for others may vary across countries, global welfare then becomes a function of the relative levels of altruistic concern between countries.

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