International Technology Transfers and Competition

Feess, Eberhard; Hoeck, Michael; Lorz, Oliver

doi:10.2139/ssrn.947049

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Second, like many other works on international technology licensing (see, e.g., Mottiner and Johnson, 2000, Kabiraj and Marjit, 2003, Mukherjee and Pennings, 2006and Feess et al 2009 we assume away foreign direct investment (FDI) by firm 1 due to an actual or perceived (e.g., due to political instability) high cost or risks associated with FDI. 8 In other words, like other papers on international technology licensing, it is implicit in our analysis that licensing dominates other strategies such as FDI.…”

Section: Unionised Labour Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Power of the Input Supplier, Technology Transfer and Consumer Welfare

Cao

Mukherjee

2014

SSRN Journal

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Section: Unionised Labour Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Power of the Input Supplier, Technology Transfer and Consumer Welfare

Cao

Mukherjee

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…Marjit and Mukherjee (1998) consider the contractual arrangements with equity participation when the success rate of the technology in the developing nations is uncertain. Fess et al (2009) analyze technology transfer across the border in a model of oligopolistic competition. Clean technology transfer between developing and developed nations (e.g., Dechezleprêtre et al 2008 andYoungman et al 2007) is an active research field that receives both political and regulatory attention.…”

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Bundled Procurement for Technology Acquisition and Future Competition

Chu

Wang

2015

M&SOM

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C onsider a buyer who would like to procure certain products for the current period and the underlying technologies so that he can become a supplier and compete with current suppliers in the future market. One potential procurement mechanism for such a buyer is to bundle the procurement project with technology acquisition. We propose a dynamic stochastic game-theoretic model that analyzes the optimal technology offer strategies of the asymmetric suppliers and highlights how the size of the current project, relative to the size of the future market, and supplier competition determine the effectiveness of the bundled procurement mechanism for the buyer. For the two-supplier case, we find that each supplier has a dominant technology offer strategy that is independent of the opponent's strategy. When the relative size of the project is small, suppliers only offer obsolete technologies even if their technologies are perfect substitutes. While suppliers offer better technologies as the project size increases, their responses in technology offers are not continuous with respect to the project size-once the project size reaches some threshold, suppliers' optimal responses jump to their best technologies. We also observe that the premium needed for technology acquisition under the bundled procurement mechanism can be negligible compared to the expected profit from the future market.

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International Technology Transfers and Competition*

Feess¹,

Hoeck²,

Lorz³

2009

Rev International Economics

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This paper analyzes North-South technology transfers in a model of oligopolistic competition and spatial product differentiation. Two firms in the North supply a high-tech good and a technically related low-tech good.They decide about licensing the low-tech good to suppliers in the South.With the license Southern firms get access to technology from the North, which enables them-with a certain probability-to enter the market for the high-tech good. Northern firms may therefore license strategically to influence the competitive environment in the high-tech market. In this setting, multiple equilibria with and without licensing may arise, and the resulting outcomes may be inefficient from the viewpoint of the Northern firms.

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International Technology Transfers and Competition

Cited by 4 publications

References 45 publications

Market Power of the Input Supplier, Technology Transfer and Consumer Welfare

Market Power of the Input Supplier, Technology Transfer and Consumer Welfare

Bundled Procurement for Technology Acquisition and Future Competition

International Technology Transfers and Competition*

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