Interne Arbeitsmärkte und Einsatz temporärer Arbeitsverhältnisse: Eine Fallstudie mit Daten eines deutschen Dienstleistungsunternehmens

Abstract

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The Productivity Effect of Temporary Agency Work: Evidence from German Panel Data

“…Although the potential for realising cost reductions is one of the reasons given for the use of TAW (Houseman, 2001;Oberst et al, 2007), up to now there is almost no evidence on the effects of TAW on the user firmÕs productivity. This comes as a surprise because both productivity and cost considerations are interchangeable in firmsÕ profitmaximising rationale and because the direction of the productivity effect remains unclear: whereas gains in flexibility following TAW use can be expected to increase the user firmÕs productivity, TAW may also harm productivity as temporary agency workers arguably possess less firm-specific human capital and permanent employeesÕ morale may suffer from TAW use.…”

“…For example, a case study using personnel data of a German firm finds that costs per hour are 29% lower for temps than for perms with similar characteristics(Oberst et al, 2007), emphasising potential cost-saving effects of TAW use.…”

Is labor flexibility a substitute to offshoring? Evidence from Italian manufacturing

“…This average masks strong heterogeneity among contracts and among countries. For instance, in Germany temp agency workers appear to suffer from a more substantial penalty: Oberst et al (2007) estimate a wage gap of 29% for 2005, while Jahn (2008), after controlling for observed and unobserved characteristics, places the penalty at 15-18%. By converse, the most discriminated category in Italy is that of project workers, 11 with a penalization of up to 25% in terms of net wage and up to 50% in terms of gross wage.…”

TFP, Labor Productivity and the (Un)Observed Labor Input: Temporary Agency Work

“…For the lower bound, which would be the maximum cost saving difference, we use the maximum wage gap from the literature. According to Jahn (2010) and Oberst et al (2008) the maximum wage gap is roughly 50%. When we assume that TAW receive only half as much as their colleagues in the client firm and that the fee payed by the client firms is without any mark-up and just covers the gross wages of TAW, the minimum discount factor would be 0.5 ( = 0.5).…”

“…2 The growing importance of TAW is inspiring a large and growing literature on the different aspects of temporary agency work. Inter alia, several studies show that there is a significant wage gap between TAW and regular employees, albeit varying in size (Jahn, 2010;Antoni & Jahn, 2009;Oberst, et al, 2008;Houseman, et al, 2003;Jahn & Rudolph, 2002). This points to potential cost savings for firms, often seen as the main incentive to use TAW (Bryson, 2013;Heywood, et al, 2011;Kleinknecht, et al, 2006;Houseman, et al, 2003).…”