Internet Firms Become Global Regulators

Abstract

Having set the backdrop to the private agreements, this chapter discusses how the non-binding agreements emerged from distinct historical and political circumstances. It provides a brief historical overview that traces the growing influence of multinational rights holders on the U.S. government’s intellectual property policymaking processes from the late 1970s to 2012. The chapter then examines in detail four U.S. intellectual property bills, including the controversial Stop Online Piracy Act, which proposed to reshape fundamentally the online regulation of intellectual property rights infringement. In doing so, the chapter documents a significant shift in enforcement strategy from a focus on removing problematic content (e.g., advertisements for counterfeit goods) to disabling entire websites for allegedly trafficking in counterfeit goods. The chapter argues that Internet firms have become global regulators (known as macro-intermediaries) attractive to governments and corporations for policing a wide range of social problems, including counterfeit goods. The chapter concludes that government officials from the U.S., U.K., and European Commission played a central role in pressuring Internet firms to adopt the non-binding agreements. These agreements serve strategic state interests as well as the financial interests of rights holders.

Regulating datafication and platformization: Policy silos and tradeoffs in international platform inquiries

“…Nevertheless, the final sample is biased toward the Global North, reflective of the asymmetrical distribution of platform inquiries globally as documented by the Puppis and Winseck (2021) and University of Chicago databases. This imbalance is symptomatic of an unequal policy dynamic over the digital economy, with the Global North as the dominant rule‐setter affecting policies in the Global South (Rosa & Hauge, 2021; Tusikov, 2017). Additionally, while most reports are national‐level, two inquiries were authored by intergovernmental bodies (Crémer et al, 2019; UNECLAC, 2018), whose geographic remit is broader than national policies.…”

“…Datafication, platformization, and platform power exceed national jurisdictions, challenging existing policy paradigms and traditional legal frameworks (Cohen, 2019; Iosifidis & Andrews, 2020; Khan, 2017; Napoli, 2019; Tusikov, 2017; van Dijck, 2021). They compound the complications digitization and technological convergence introduce to governance regimes overseeing communications and data flows (Krämer & Wohlfarth, 2018), and contribute to policy gaps and silos at the state level (Moore & Tambini, 2022).…”

“…Some inquiries recognize this, noting that “citizens and readers obtain their political information from both old and new platforms” (Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms, 2019, p. 196), implying that algorithmic transparency requirements and platform content standards are too narrow for the problem. Moreover, focusing on the app layer of GAFAM ignores problematic moderation concerns at less visible layers of the internet stack, such as shutdowns by cloud service providers like Amazon's AWS, which cut off service to the alt‐right platform Parler (McSherry, 2021) and Wikileaks a decade earlier (Tusikov, 2017). Third, the focus on GAFAM carries downstream effects for policy design by influencing which company representatives are asked to policy hearings; what policy issues end up on the agenda and receive political resources; and, finally, what policies are implemented.…”

Meta Governance of Path Dependencies: Regulation, Welfare, and Markets

“…Penetration of cybermarkets into welfare path dependencies and national security path dependencies puts new demands on regulatory institutions. Cybermarkets are regulated by novel forms of choke point regulation (Tusikov 2017). This is overwhelmingly private policing by firms like Facebook, Google, and TikTok.…”

Cybercrime: Traditional Problems and Modern Solutions

“…257 Even with self-regulation, one can see the influence of government in the form of constructing, shaping promoting and/or facilitating self-regulation. 258 15.2 Government action through legislation plays an important role in combating cybercrime despite some libertarian perspectives which strongly oppose government use of law and regulation to intervene in the development of cyberspace. 259 Despite this important role state regulatory institutions have limitations when it comes to regulating cyberspace due to the nature of cyberspace.…”