Internet QoS and Regulations

Shetty, Nikhil; Schwartz, Galina; Walrand, Jean

doi:10.1109/tnet.2010.2048757

Cited by 57 publications

(86 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…For a wired ISP, κ can be interpreted as the percentage of capacity deployed for private peering points that charge a fee of c per unit incoming traffic and 1 − κ can be interpreted as the percentage of capacity deployed for public peering points where incoming traffic is charge-free. For a wireless ISP, κ can be interpreted as the percentage of capacity devoted for the premium traffic that will be charged at a rate of c. The pair of parameters (κ, c) can also be thought of a type of Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) [11,13], where one ordinary and another premium service class have capacities of (1 − κ)µ and κµ and charge 0 and c respectively. In reality, content might be delegated via content distribution networks (CDNs), e.g.…”

Section: Differentiated Service Classesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Congestion equilibrium for differentiated service classes

Richard

Misra

2011

2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)

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In this paper, we introduce the notation of a congestion equilibrium where competing players share a common level of congestion in the system. We illustrate the concept by developing a framework under which content providers (CPs) compete for a last-mile bottleneck capacity of an ISP so as to service their users. We show that under minor monotonicity assumptions on the system congestion and traffic rates, a unique congestion equilibrium exists. Under an independence of scale assumption, we characterize the congestion and rates in equilibrium as continuous homogeneous functions. In particular, the congestion in equilibrium can be characterized by a continuous non-increasing function of the per capita capacity of the system. Through examples, we show that various congestion metrics apply to our model, e.g. M/M/1 delay metric and throughput metrics that results from work-conserving congestion control mechanism.By using the congestion equilibrium as a building block, we further model class-based service differentiations of an ISP under which CPs choose service class and compete resource with other CPs in the same service class. We formulate a two-stage strategic game between an ISP and the CPs. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and competitive equilibrium, which is based on a corresponding congestiontaking assumption, and propose an algorithm to practical solve a competitive equilibrium.

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Section: Differentiated Service Classesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Congestion equilibrium for differentiated service classes

Richard

Misra

2011

2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)

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“…By assuming that N is sufficiently large such that each user is negligible, we use a continuum user population model and normalize the number of users to 1 [1]- [6]. In general, WSP W may offer multiple data plans, and users can choose any of the plans depending on their own preferences (the user choice shall be detailed later).…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In general, WSP W may offer multiple data plans, and users can choose any of the plans depending on their own preferences (the user choice shall be detailed later). As in [6], to keep the analysis tractable, we assume that WSP W offers up to two data plans, represented by P 1 and P 2 , respectively. For notational convenience, we also refer to users that subscribe to the plan P i as P i −users (or P i −subscribers), for i = 1, 2.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Assumption 1 can be considered as an expression of user diversity in terms of the benefits and their data demand. The lower bound on the interval is set as zero to simplify the analysis, and this will be the case when there is enough diversity in the users so that there are non-subscribers for any positive price [5] [6]. Assumption 2 captures the user rationality.…”

Section: B User Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By taking into account the congestion cost (i.e., negative network externality), [4] studies the feasibility of Paris Metro pricing (PMP) and shows sufficient conditions on the congestion cost functions, under which PMP leads to a higher revenue or social welfare than flat-rate pricing. Pricing decisions (restricted to unlimited data plans) and network capacity decisions in the presence of network congestion effects are studied in [6], where a missing part is the analysis of users' subscription decisions. In [7], time-dependent pricing is studied from the perspective of its efficiency in terms of revenues.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Data demand dynamics and profit maximization in communications markets

Ren

Schaar

2011

IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference

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In this paper, we focus on the users' aggregate data demand dynamics in a wireless communications market served by a monopolistic wireless service provider (WSP). Based on the equilibrium data demand, we optimize the WSP's data plans and long-term network capacity decisions to maximize its profit. For a market where two different data plans are offered, it is shown that the existence of a unique equilibrium data demand depends on the data plans, and the convergence of data demand dynamics is subject to the network congestion cost, which is closely related to the WSP's network capacity. A sufficient condition on the network congestion cost indicates that the WSP needs to provide a sufficiently large network capacity to guarantee the convergence of data demand dynamics. Then, we formalize the problem of optimizing the WSP's data plans and network capacities to maximize its profit, and solve it numerically.

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An adaptive Paris Metro Pricing scheme for mobile data networks

Huang

Lee

et al. 2016

Int J Network Mgmt

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Summary Because static pricing models (such as flat‐rate or tiered‐rate models) cannot improve user utility for subscribers and ease network congestion for operators during peak time, Smart Data Pricing has become an important incentive for mobile data markets. Paris Metro Pricing (PMP), which is a static pricing mode inspired by the pricing model for the Paris metro system, uses differentiated prices to motivate users to choose different train classes. Before choosing a class, people will consider their expected quality of service versus the prices that they are willing to pay. Even though PMP cannot guarantee the actual quality of service during service time, a balance between users' utilities and operators' revenue is achieved. In this paper, we propose an adaptive PMP scheme, so‐called APMP, which determines the dynamic access prices of different classes for the next 24 h. The accessible prices should try to increase the revenue while operators can serve more subscribers. Our simulation results show that APMP can significantly improve total revenue and average revenue per user for the operator. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Internet QoS and Regulations

Cited by 57 publications

References 20 publications

Congestion equilibrium for differentiated service classes

Congestion equilibrium for differentiated service classes

Data demand dynamics and profit maximization in communications markets

An adaptive Paris Metro Pricing scheme for mobile data networks

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