Internet voting in the U.S.

Sımons, Barbara; Jones, Douglas R.

doi:10.1145/2347736.2347754

Cited by 28 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Clearly, i-voting raises security issues, making it important that computer scientists investigate the risks associated with voting online and how they can be tackled (see e.g. Simons & Jones 2012). The main contribution political scientists can deliver is evidence regarding the turnout effect of i-voting.…”

Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internet voting and turnout: Evidence from Switzerland

Germann

Serdült

2017

Electoral Studies

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Internet voting (i-voting) is often discussed as a potential remedy against declining turnout rates. This paper presents new evidence on the causal effect of i-voting on turnout, drawing on trials conducted in two Swiss cantons: Geneva and Zurich. Both Geneva and Zurich constitute hard cases for i-voting, given that i-voting was introduced in the presence of postal voting. However, this setting allows us to test some of the more optimistic claims regarding i-voting's ability to increase turnout. Empirically, we exploit the advantageous circumstance that federal legislation created a situation coming close to a natural experiment, with some of Geneva's and Zurich's municipalities participating in i-voting trials and others not. Using difference-indifferences estimation, we find that i-voting did not increase turnout in the cantons of Geneva and Zurich.

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Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internet voting and turnout: Evidence from Switzerland

Germann

Serdült

2017

Electoral Studies

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“…Remote terminals (PCs) used by voters may be infected with many types of programs and malicious codes (or botnet network). Voter‐side malware poses serious risks to the casted ballot by voters such as credential theft, modification of the ballot before encryption, sending the ballot to definite destination, and prevention of voting . To address this problem, we have used Java Card 3.…”

Section: Security Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new secure Internet voting protocol using Java Card 3 technology and Java information flow concept

Mohammadpourfard

Doostari

Ghaznavi‐Ghoushchi

et al. 2014

Security Comm Networks

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Recently, there has been a spate of interest in Internet voting systems because of advantages such as participation, efficiency, accuracy, and transparency. However, challenges for having a secure i‐voting system are considerable. Unless these systems are designed and implemented carefully, citizens might lose their trust on the whole voting process. This paper introduces a novel online voting protocol, which satisfies the desired security requirements of i‐voting as collusion resistance, fairness, coercion\bribery, and secure voting platform. Although Internet voting systems provide convenience for voters by requiring just a PC and an Internet connection, they might be subject to some drawbacks as PCs are very susceptible to malware and sophisticated attacks. To clarify, voter side insecure platform is one of the biggest challenges in Internet voting, which would breach voter's privacy and also affect the integrity of election. In this paper, we present an alternative to the voters' insecure PCs. Java Card 3 is the latest version of Java Card, which could be considered as voter's portable secure Web server. It can obtain an IP address and communicate with other network nodes with hypertext transfer protocol secure (HTTPS). Therefore, regardless of utilizing a trusted device at the client side, end‐to‐end security is guaranteed. This means that Java Card 3 can resolve challenges, which are posed by insecurity of the vote casting PC. Furthermore, to enhance the security and guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the data, which are stored in the card during the voting process, we have used Java information flow. An implementation of this protocol is proposed on the basis of Java Card 3 servlet container and Web server technology in which the card and electoral servers communicate on a machine‐to‐machine basis. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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“…Communications of partial, hand counted, results between polling station during election day is done electronically. 'Since we can bank online, why can't we vote online' goes the argument (Simons & Jones, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blockchain, consensus, and cryptography in electronic voting

Grontas¹,

Pagourtzis²

2019

HomVir

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Motivated by the recent trends to conduct electronic elections using blockchain technologies, we review the vast literature on cryptographic voting and assess the status of the field. We analyze the security requirements for voting systems and describe the major ideas behind the most influential cryptographic protocols for electronic voting. We focus on the great importance of consensus in the elimination of trusted third parties. Finally, we examine whether recent blockchain innovations can satisfy the strict requirements set for the security of electronic voting.

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Internet voting in the U.S.

Abstract: Internet voting is unachievable for the foreseeable future and therefore not inevitable.

Cited by 28 publications

References 1 publication

Internet voting and turnout: Evidence from Switzerland

Internet voting and turnout: Evidence from Switzerland

A new secure Internet voting protocol using Java Card 3 technology and Java information flow concept

Blockchain, consensus, and cryptography in electronic voting

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