Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences

Russo, Federica; Williamson, Jon

doi:10.1080/02698590701498084

Cited by 385 publications

(244 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Similarly, as many philosophers and scientists have noticed, the notion of "causation" in biology needs to be treated differently than in physics and chemistry, see for instance [61,[65][66][67][68]. Joffe [69] (p. 181) distinguishes three distinct types of causation operating in physiology corresponding to four types of explanations in biology stated above: "the evolutionary cause that explains how a particular feature (including genetic variation) came to be present in a particular type of organism; the developmental cause that brought it about in that individual; and the "current" or proximal cause or mechanism that is the consequence of these".…”

Section: Pragmatic Information and Causationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatic Information as a Unifying Biological Concept

Maleeh

2014

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This paper aims to introduce a developed reading of Roederer's interpretation of pragmatic information as a good candidate for a Unifying Information Concept required for an as-yet-unavailable Science of Information. According to pragmatic information, information and information processing are exclusive attributes of biological systems related to the very definition of life. I will apply the notion to give new accounts in the following areas: (1) quantum interpretation: based on a modified version of David Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics, I propose an ontological, information-based interpretation of quantum mechanics which, unlike Roederer's interpretation, satisfies all conditions of pragmatic information; (2) artificial intelligence: the notion successfully distinguishes natural living systems from artifacts and natural non-living systems, providing a context to pose an information-based argument against the thesis of Strong Artificial Intelligence; (3) phenomenal consciousness: I will use pragmatic information to modify and update Chalmers's Double-aspect Theory of Information to be explanatorily more powerful regarding the physical aspect of his theory; (4) causation: based on pragmatic information, I pose a new account of causation which differentiates causation in biology from causation in natural abiotic world.

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Section: Pragmatic Information and Causationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatic Information as a Unifying Biological Concept

Maleeh

2014

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“…We are aware that this brings us back to a probabilistic, not-necessarily-causal interpretation of such evidence, somewhat reversing Illari's and Russo/Williamson's change of terminology from "probabilistic evidence" (Russo and Williamson 2007) to "evidence of difference-making" (Russo and Williamson 2010). However, we find this to be the most accurate way to describe exactly what is being evidenced.…”

Section: Redefining Difference-making Evidence For the Health Sciencesmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…Difference-making evidence in support of a given causal claim in the health sciences has been defined as evidence that a cause "makes a difference to" an effect (Russo and Williamson 2007) and "evidence that the effect does indeed vary with the postulated cause" (Illari 2011). The trouble with the term "difference-making" is that it closely resembles the notion of causation, simply because of the similarity between the verbs "making" and "causing".…”

Section: Redefining Difference-making Evidence For the Health Sciencesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Evidence, illness, and causation: An epidemiological perspective on the Russo–Williamson Thesis

Fiorentino

Dammann

2015

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in

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According to the Russo-Williamson thesis, causal claims in the health sciences need to be supported by both difference-making and mechanistic evidence. In this article, we attempt to determine whether Evidence-based Medicine (EBM) can be improved through the consideration of mechanistic evidence. We discuss the practical composition and function of each RWT evidence type and propose that exposure-outcome evidence (previously known as difference-making evidence) provides associations that can be explained through a hypothesis of causation, while mechanistic evidence provides finer-grained associations and knowledge of entities that ultimately explains a causal hypothesis. We suggest that mechanistic evidence holds untapped potential to add value to the assessment of evidence quality in EBM and propose initial recommendations for the integration of mechanistic and exposure-outcome evidence to improve EBM by robustly leveraging available evidence in support of good medical decisions.

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“…48 See Bernard Seyfert's arguments against Semmelweis immediately following those of Scanzoni, cited in footnote 45, p. 34-36. 49 Russo and Williamson (2007), p. 163, argue that the mechanistic question could only be answered with the advent of the germ theory of disease. I think this is overly pessimistic: Whether a particular causal process constitutes a proper mechanism will depend on the accepted bottoming-out activities (Machamer et al, 2000, p. 13-14).…”

Section: From Causal To Mechanistic Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Causal inference, mechanisms, and the Semmelweis case

Scholl

2013

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

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Semmelweis's discovery of the cause of puerperal fever around the middle of the 19th century counts among the paradigm cases of scientific discovery. For several decades, philosophers of science have used the episode to illustrate, appraise and compare views of proper scientific methodology.Here I argue that the episode can be profitably reexamined in light of two cognate notions: causal reasoning and mechanisms. Semmelweis used several causal reasoning strategies both to support his own and to reject competing hypotheses. However, these strategies have gone unappreciated in the existing literature. I show that a causal reasoning approach makes sense of the multitude of tables in Semmelweis's main text, which in later editions were often abridged because they appeared redundant.Moreoever, the existing literature tends to focus on Semmelweis's clinical intervention and on the extent to which it alone confirms his theoretical conclusions. This neglects Semmelweis's efforts to show by animal experiments that his clinical results are in agreement with a demonstrable mechanism of puerperal fever pathogenesis. I argue that the full evidential force of Semmelweis's argument can only be appreciated if both his clinical and his laboratory investigations are taken into account.

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Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences

Cited by 385 publications

References 23 publications

Pragmatic Information as a Unifying Biological Concept

Pragmatic Information as a Unifying Biological Concept

Evidence, illness, and causation: An epidemiological perspective on the Russo–Williamson Thesis

Causal inference, mechanisms, and the Semmelweis case

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