Intimidating voters with violence and mobilizing them with clientelism

Abstract

Recent research suggests that intimidating voters and electoral clientelism are two strategies on the menu of manipulation, often used in conjunction. We do not know much, however, about who is targeted with which of these illicit electoral strategies. This article devises and tests a theoretical argument on the targeting of clientelism and intimidation across different voters. We argue that in contexts where violence can be used to influence elections, parties may choose to demobilize swing and opposition voters, which frees up resources to mobilize their likely supporters with clientelism. While past research on this subject has either been purely theoretical or confined to single country studies, we offer a first systematic cross-national and multilevel analysis of clientelism and voter intimidation in seven African countries. We analyze which voters most fear being intimidated with violence and which get targeted with clientelistic benefits, combining new regional-level election data with Afrobarometer survey data. In a multilevel analysis, we model the likelihood of voters being targeted with either strategy as a function of both past election results of the region they live in and their partisan status. We find that voters living in incumbent strongholds are most likely to report having being bribed in elections, whereas those living in opposition strongholds are most fearful of violent intimidation. We further provide suggestive evidence of a difference between incumbent supporters and other voters. We find support that incumbent supporters are more likely to report being targeted with clientelism, and mixed support for the idea that they are less fearful of intimidation. Our findings allow us to define potential hot spots of intimidation. They also provide an explanation for why parties in young democracies concentrate more positive inducements on their own supporters than the swing voter model of campaigning would lead us to expect.

Unequal votes, unequal violence: Malapportionment and election violence in India

“…This expectation is consistent with theoretical and empirical work suggesting that incumbents invest in clientelism and patronage in areas where they are strong, but refrain from using coercion in safe districts and instead supply violence in contested areas (Rauschenbach & Paula, 2019; Robinson & Torvik, 2009). It is also in line with empirical findings showing that voters in rural constituencies experience less violence and intimidation (Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012; Rauschenbach & Paula, 2019), but are more often targeted with clientelism (Berenschot, 2018; Kramon, 2019; Rauschenbach & Paula, 2019; Stokes et al, 2013). 4 Regarding incentives for local opposition parties, the logic of opposition weakness would seemingly imply that they use violence in districts with a bias in favor of local incumbents.…”

“…Recent work on Zambia, however, indicates that dominance rather than close competition leads to more violence (Wahman & Goldring, 2020). Rauschenbach & Paula (2019) also find that African voters in opposition strongholds are more fearful of violence.…”

“…For a recent review, see Mares & Young (2016). several studies showing that core supporters of the opponent in competitive areas are more likely to be targeted (Bratton, 2008;Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014;Kasara, 2014;Rauschenbach & Paula, 2019). At the macro level, Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski (2014) argue that incumbents fearful of losing power -especially if unconstrained by institutions -are more likely to use state repression and support this claim with cross-national data.…”

“…Formal theoretical work explains that parties concentrate coercive targeting in close electoral contests, and that they use voters’ partisan preferences for deciding who to target, although predictions disagree on whether swing or core opposition voters in competitive areas are targeted more (Robinson & Torvik, 2009). The available micro-level evidence is more supportive of the core voter hypothesis, with several studies showing that core supporters of the opponent in competitive areas are more likely to be targeted (Bratton, 2008; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014; Kasara, 2014; Rauschenbach & Paula, 2019). At the macro level, Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski (2014) argue that incumbents fearful of losing power – especially if unconstrained by institutions – are more likely to use state repression and support this claim with cross-national data.…”

Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems

“…The most plausible answer is provided by scholars who stress the potentially demobilizing effect that violence may have among voters. Through peddling fear, parties can utilize pre-election violence to reduce turnout for rival parties (Collier & Vicente, 2012; Gutiérrez-Romero & LeBas, 2020; Rauchenbach & Paula, 2019). 3 Although this theory is intuitively sound, Bekoe & Burchard (2017) found no aggregate negative relationship between levels of pre-election violence and electoral turnout in African countries.…”