Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests

Nitzan, Shmuel; Ueda, Kaoru

doi:10.1007/s00355-013-0762-y

Cited by 32 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…8 We assume that the prize is a group-specific public-good (see, e.g., Baik, Kim and Na, 2001). Alternative prize distribution rules have also been explored, such as Nitzan and Ueda (2011) and Nitzan and Ueda (2014).…”

Section: Model and Theoretical Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sorting and communication in weak-link group contests

Brookins

Lightle

Ryvkin

2018

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Section: Model and Theoretical Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sorting and communication in weak-link group contests

Brookins

Lightle

Ryvkin

2018

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…When

c_{i} false(a false)

is strictly convex, so is

\frac{1}{N_{i}} \cdot c_{i} false(a false)

. Hence we can apply a result by Nitzan and Ueda () on the relation of intragroup heterogeneity and strictly convex marginal effort costs (their Proposition ) to derive the desired result.

▪

…”

Section: Proofsmentioning

confidence: 79%

“…When

c_{i} false(a false)

is strictly convex, so is

\frac{1}{N_{i}} \cdot c_{i} false(a false)

. Hence we can apply a result by Nitzan and Ueda () on the relation of intragroup heterogeneity and strictly convex marginal effort costs (their Proposition ) to derive the desired result.

▪

Proof of Proposition Since the contributions induced under a cost‐sharing rule are the same as in the original model, we have as the relation between each individual's contribution and the aggregate effort intended by the group leader. Because of the convexity of

{\overset{E}{true}}_{i} false(A_{i}; {boldv}_{i} false)

0true 0 = \frac{\sum_{j \neq i} A_{j}}{A^{2}} N_{i} - {\hat{E^{'}}}_{i} ((), A_{i}; v_{i}) = \frac{\sum_{j \neq i} A_{j}}{A^{2}} N_{i} - \sum_{k = 1}^{N_{i}} \frac{{c^{'}}_{i} (a_{i k} (A_{i}; {boldv}_{i}))}{v_{i k}} \cdot \frac{\frac{v_{i k}}{{c^{''}}_{i} ((), a_{i k} ((), A_{i}; v_{i}))}}{0true \sum_{p = 1}^{N_{i}} \frac{v_{i p}}{{c^{''}}_{i} ((), a_{i p} ((), A_{i}; v_{i}))}}

is a fi...…”

Section: Proofsmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…Epstein and Mealem () and Ryvkin () examine how the composition of individuals in competing groups affects the equilibrium effort levels. Nitzan and Ueda () clarify how the form of effort cost functions determines the relation between intragroup heterogeneity and the equilibrium group effort. Most of the existing literature, however, ignores the possibility that a competing group introduces an incentive device.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The reason is, as shown by Baik (), that in this case only individuals with the largest valuation of the prize in a group put effort, and all the other group members become pure free riders (see also D. Lee [] for interesting related results). But Nitzan and Ueda () point out that such exploitation is impossible if the elasticity of marginal effort costs is large. We will present another example of the peculiarity of the model with linear cost functions in Section .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Selective incentives and intragroup heterogeneity in collective contests

Nitzan

Ueda

2018

J Public Economic Theory

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A group taking part in a contest has to confront the collective action problem among its members, and devices of selective incentives are possible means of resolution. We argue that heterogeneous prize‐valuations in a competing group normally prevent effective use of such selective incentives. To substantiate this claim, we adopt cost‐sharing as a means of incentivizing the individual group members. We confirm that homogeneous prize valuations within a group result in a cost‐sharing rule inducing the first‐best individual contributions. As long as the cost‐sharing rule is dependent only on the members’ contributions, however, such a first‐best rule does not exist for a group with intragroup heterogeneity. Our main result clarifies how unequal prize valuations affect the cost‐sharing rule and, in particular, the degree of cost‐sharing. If the relative rate of change of the marginal effort costs is decreasing, it is reduced by intragroup heterogeneity. If the rate is increasing, the cost is fully shared, but it cannot induce the first‐best contributions for the group.

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The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods

Dickson¹

2017

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Consider an environment in which individuals are organised into groups, they contribute to the collective action of their group, and are influenced by the collective actions of other groups; there are externalities between groups that are transmitted through the aggregation of groups' actions. The theory of 'aggregative games' has been successfully applied to study games in which players' payoffs depend only on their own strategy and a single aggregation of all players' strategies, but the setting just described features multiple aggregations of actions-one for each group-in which the nature of the intra-group strategic interaction may be very different to the inter-group strategic interaction. The aim of this contribution is to establish a framework within which to consider such 'multiple aggregate games'; present a method to analyse the existence and properties of Nash equilibria; and to discuss some applications of the theory to demonstrate how useful the technique is for analysing strategic interactions involving individuals in groups.

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Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests

Cited by 32 publications

References 23 publications

Sorting and communication in weak-link group contests

Sorting and communication in weak-link group contests

Selective incentives and intragroup heterogeneity in collective contests

The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods

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