Intra-party politics and interest groups: missing links in explaining government effectiveness

Cerón, Andrea; Curini, Luigi; Negri, Fedra

doi:10.1007/s11127-019-00644-0

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 69 publications

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“…Some MPs take to Twitter to circumvent limitations on their speech imposed by partisan structures in other arenas, using Twitter as a substitute medium. From a measurement perspective, this finding contributes to the recent strand of literature trying to identify intra-party dissent through analysis of politicians' communication in various means (Ceron et al, 2019;Sältzer, 2020).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 63%

Politicians unleashed? Political communication on Twitter and in parliament in Western Europe

Silva

Proksch

2021

PSRM

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Twitter is a prominent communication tool for politicians with two potential uses: as a “substitute” channel to circumvent constraints from other political arenas, or as an “amplifier” that reinforces party messages. Using a novel dataset containing tweets and parliamentary speeches by members of parliament (MPs) in seven countries, we estimate politicians’ positions and intra-party dissent on European integration. We find that MPs’ sentiment about Europe on Twitter is a valid measure of their party's position, while also uncovering intra-party disagreements. Our results suggest that most MPs amplify the partisan message, but MPs who participate less in parliamentary debate tend to have larger differences with their party on Twitter. Social media thus can free politicians from their party's grip.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 63%

Politicians unleashed? Political communication on Twitter and in parliament in Western Europe

Silva

Proksch

2021

PSRM

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“…By doing that we contribute to the existing literature on heads of state and non‐political actors showing that political statements made by non‐partisan actors can still be used to evaluate their ideological leaning. Indeed, several studies are trying to expand the scope of the CMP‐style hand‐coding of textual documents, providing new and original contributions in the field of comparative politics (e.g., Ceron et al., 2019; Ceron & Negri, 2018; Dolezal et al., 2018; Enggist & Pinggera, 2022).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In order to build our main independent variable, Ideological Distance, to test H1, these positions have been put in contrast with the position of each Italian cabinet. Such data was taken from the Italian Legislative Speeches Dataset (ILSD: Ceron et al., 2019), which was built through the hand‐coding of cabinets investiture debates based on the same coding scheme. This ensures the comparability between the two data sources.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideological Disagreement and the Rejection of Laws by Italian Heads of State

Ceron

2024

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Heads of state in parliamentary democracies are usually perceived as neutral and non‐partisan political actors. However, they can make autonomous political choices, sometimes oriented by their own partisan preferences. Focusing on the Italian case, we analyze the propensity of the president of the Republic to publicly express political disagreement by rejecting the promulgation of laws. We contribute to the literature by creating and exploiting a new dataset, based on a content analysis of presidents' investiture speeches and New Year's Eve messages which maps the ideological position of Italian heads of state and their distance from the cabinet over more than 75 years (1946–2022). We show that such ideological distance increases the number of laws rejected by the president. This effect holds when controlling for the size and heterogeneity of the government coalition, as well as the state of the economy and the occurrence of crises.

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“…Second, beyond the welfare conditionality literature, the broader literature on social policy and policy change suggests three other possible causes for the punitive turn. The first is intra‐party electoral competition (see Ceron et al, 2019; Marx & Schumacher, 2013). While some party factions may highlight the importance of employing stringent conditionalities to build human capital or cut public expenditures, others may advocate for lax conditionalities or no conditions at all to avoid excluding the more vulnerable recipients.…”

Section: Electoral Competition As a Driver Of The Punitive Turn In We...mentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of sanctioning the poor through welfare conditionality: Revealing causal mechanisms in Uruguay

2023

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What explains the ‘punitive turn’ toward more stringent conditionalities in welfare policies? Answering this question is crucial in a region such as Latin America, where cash transfers have proven politically consequential for incumbents. Our argument emphasises the role of electoral competition in shaping a government's decision to adopt a more punitive approach to conditionalities. We use process tracing to test our argument in a case involving a change from relatively lax to more stringent conditionalities in Uruguay's system of conditional cash transfers (CCTs). We also test other explanations from the welfare conditionality and the welfare and policy change literatures. We find that, as public opinion increasingly turned against state assistance to the poor, the opposition politicised the issue of non‐enforcement of conditionalities. This led Uruguay's left‐wing government to shift to more stringent enforcement of conditionalities to avoid alienating members of its electoral base who were not CCT beneficiaries. Our findings contribute to the current debate on why and how governments choose to sanction welfare recipients as a response to political dynamics, both in developed and developing regions.

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Intra-party politics and interest groups: missing links in explaining government effectiveness

Cited by 9 publications

References 69 publications

Politicians unleashed? Political communication on Twitter and in parliament in Western Europe

Politicians unleashed? Political communication on Twitter and in parliament in Western Europe

Ideological Disagreement and the Rejection of Laws by Italian Heads of State

The politics of sanctioning the poor through welfare conditionality: Revealing causal mechanisms in Uruguay

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