Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists)

Trogdon, Kelly

doi:10.1080/00048400903204010

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…For example, Sider (2007) argues that priority monism is incompatible with our best account of intrinsic properties. For discussion, see Trogdon (2009Trogdon ( , 2010 and Skiles (2009). And Tallant and Ingram (2012a, b) and Corkum (2014) argue that there are reasons specific to presentism why presentists should not use distributional properties as truthmakers for past claims; for discussion see Cameron (2013) and Green (2017).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Salience and metaphysical explanation

Corkum

2021

Synthese

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Metaphysical explanations, unlike many other kinds of explanation, are standardly thought to be insensitive to our epistemic situation and so are not evaluable by cognitive values such as salience. I consider a case study that challenges this view. Some properties are distributed over an extension. For example, the property of being polka-dotted red on white, when instantiated, is distributed over a surface. Similar properties have been put to work in a variety of explanatory tasks in recent metaphysics, including: providing an analysis of change, giving to presentists truthmakers for past claims; giving to priority monists an account of basic heterogeneous entities; and giving to friends of extended simples an explanation of how an extended simple can enjoy qualitative variation. I argue that such explanations exhibit salience failure. How ought we represent the semantics of salience? Differences in linguistic stress induce semantic differences similar to the semantic differences induced in explanations by differences in salience, and I will draw an analogy with linguistic theories of focus sensitivity to sketch how one might model the role of salience in these kinds of explanations. I end with a few tentative conclusions about the role of cognitive values in metaphysical explanations. Some theorists view the citation of a ground as a sufficient explanation. If certain explanations appealing to distributed properties exhibit attenuated salience, then arguably the mere citation of a ground does not always provide an adequate explanation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Salience and metaphysical explanation

Corkum

2021

Synthese

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“…Skiles (2009) describes an extrinsic property that seems to satisfy (i) and (ii) by being independent of accompaniment and grounded in relations that cross mereological levels. However, see Trogdon's (2010) reply to Skiles' objection. tains. It is a matter of controversy whether talk of grounding should be embraced or viewed with suspicion, and it is a matter of controversy even for those who take the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction seriously.…”

Section: Grounding or Identity?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended

Francescotti¹

2014

Companion to Intrinsic Properties

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A sentence or statement or proposition that ascribes intrinsic properties to something is entirely about that thing … A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else, is … The intrinsic properties of something depend only on that thing … If something has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing … (Lewis 1983a, p. 197) I once offered a definition that was meant to capture the notion expressed by the intuitive descriptions in this quote from Lewis.¹ The basic idea is that F is an intrinsic property of an item x just in case x's having F consists entirely in x'sha ving certain internal properties, where an internal property is one whose instantiation does not consist in one's relation to any distinct items (items other than oneself and one's proper parts). I still think that this relational analysis is largely correct, and here I wish to provide additional support for it and defend it against some objections that have been raised. In the process I aim to make the account somewhat more precise, especially by contrasting it with a grounding approach to defining the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. In Favor of a Hyperintensional AccountConsider those properties that must be exemplified by any item that exists. Following Weatherson and Marshall (2013), let's call them "indiscriminately necessary" properties. Being self-identical is an indiscriminately necessary property. Unlike the property of being identical with Dennett, being self-identical is a property that cannot go unexemplified by anything. In addition to being indiscriminately necessary, the property of being self-identical also seems to be intrinsic; having this property does not seem to be a matter of how an item relates to anything distinct from itself. While this one seems intrinsic, some indiscriminately necessary properties (INPs) appear to be extrinsic. Assuming that numbers exist and exist necessarily, the property of coexisting with the number 9 is an INP. Given realism about numbers, our coexisting with 9 consists in our relation to something distinct from ourselves, which seems to make it an extrinsic feature of you and me.  See Francescotti (1999).

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“…9 9 Due to limitations of space, there are a number of attempted analyses of intriniscality that I can't discuss. These include Michael Dunn's analysis (Dunn 1990) in terms of relevance, Robert Francescotti's analysis (Francescotti 1999) in terms of relationality, Stephen Yablo's sophisticated contractionist analysis (Yablo 1999), David Denby's analysis (Denby 2006), (Denby 2010) in terms of instantiation under relations, Vera Hoffman‐Kolss's anlaysis (Hoffmann‐Kolss 2010b) in terms of relationality, Kelly Trogdon's analysis (Trogdon 2009), (Trogdon 2010) in terms of grounding, Gideon Rosen's analysis (Rosen 2010), also in terms of grounding, and my own analysis in terms of positivity. For discussion of some of these analyses see (Sider 1996), (Weatherson 2006), (Parsons 2007), (Hoffmann‐Kolss 2010a), (Bader 2010), (Skiles 2009) and (Marshall MS).…”

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confidence: 99%

Analyses of Intrinsicality without Naturalness

Marshall

2013

Philosophy Compass

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Over the last 30 years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. This article discusses three leading attempts to analyse this distinction that don't appeal to the notion of naturalness: the duplication analysis endorsed by G. E. Moore and David Lewis, Peter Vallentyne's analysis in terms of contractions of possible worlds, and the analysis of Gene Witmer, William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon in terms of grounding.

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Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists)

Cited by 6 publications

References 6 publications

Salience and metaphysical explanation

Salience and metaphysical explanation

Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended

Analyses of Intrinsicality without Naturalness

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