Introducing and Exploring the Extremist Cybercrime Database (ECCD)

Abstract

This study uses open source, public information to examine nation-state and non-nation-state ideologically motivated cyberattacks performed against US targets from 1998 to 2018. We created the Extremist Cyber Crime Database (ECCD) that includes scheme, offender and target codebooks to address gaps in existing research and better inform policymakers. We describe our open source collection procedures, the type of information uncovered, and how we assessed their quality and reliability. We highlight our findings, compare these extremist cyber-crimes to extremist real world violence, and discuss their conceptual and policy implications.

Unpacking the political-criminal nexus in state-cybercrimes: a macro-level typology

“…When we look at crime and deviancy in cyberspace, alongside the profit-or emotion-driven cybercrimes that have been extensively investigated by criminologists especially over the last couple of decades, we can also find a number of so-called 'political cybercrimes'-here broadly defined as all those behaviours occurring in or facilitated by cyberspace and pivoting around a political element, being the final aim of said behaviour a political act, a policy or an idea (as defined in Lavorgna 2020b). These behaviours have overall received relatively less attention, with the exception of terrorism, political extremism and radicalization (e.g., Hollewell and Longpré 2021; Holt et al 2022;Jangada Correia 2022).…”

Assessing nation‐state‐sponsored cyberattacks using aspects of Situational Crime Prevention

“…For example, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks render web services inoperable for a period of time, but do not require attackers to gain access to internal systems (Collier et al., 2021; Holt, Chermak, et al., 2023). DDoS atacks can be performed with relative ease, whether through the use of malicious software to direct malicious traffic to the target, or through paid services that facilitate the attack through a fee‐for‐service model (Collier et al., 2021).…”

“…DDoS atacks can be performed with relative ease, whether through the use of malicious software to direct malicious traffic to the target, or through paid services that facilitate the attack through a fee‐for‐service model (Collier et al., 2021). In addition, DDoS attacks are quite visible to the target as they limit the ability of users to engage with the service (Holt, Chermak, et al., 2023). It is also difficult for an affected service provider to determine the origin of the attack, making them an excellent tool for both nation‐states and ideological actors alike (Andress & Winterfeld, 2013; Jordan & Taylor, 2004).…”

“…There are also doxing activities, where actors acquire sensitive data that may or may not be publicly accessible through hacking and other means and then make this information publicly available to embarrass or harass their target (Anderson & Wood, 2021; Holt, Chermak, et al., 2023). Posting publicly accessible information, even in an aggregated fashion, requires less technical skill and access by actors.…”

“…Both of these forms of doxing may be visible to the intended target, as victim information is made available in some fashion. Studies have noted the use of doxing by ideologically motivated actors without state sponsorship, often because the target aligns with the attackers’ beliefs (Holt et al., 2020; Holt, Chermak, et al., 2023). There is less evidence of nation‐states engaging in doxing activities (Mandiant, 2022), though it is unclear why this may be the case.…”