Introduction

Fishel, Jeff; Hammond, Webb

doi:10.1080/07343468709507956

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“…This was due to the fact that the four SCJ-5 Civil Affairs (CA) planners had little actual CA experience and none of them had Top Secret clearances. 31 These temporary planners were brought in on month-long rotations to work at a completely separate location from those planning combat operations. As these small teams of planners finished their month of planning, they would be -read out‖ of the plan which meant they could not discuss updates they had made with other planners back at their brigade headquarters.…”

Section: The Secret Of Our Successfailurementioning

confidence: 99%

How to Fail at Post-Hostilities Planning at the Operational Level

Chowning¹

2009

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTDistribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy. ABSTRACTCombatant commander leadership is THE critical factor in ensuring robust, operational planning is done for post-hostilities (Phase IV). This can be seen by looking at the Phase IV failures in both Panama and Iraq. Both these Phase IV planning failures followed successful combat operations in Phase III, but the combatant commanders failed to ensure as much effort was put into Phase IV planning as Phase III. In fact, they failed to ensure there was any real plan at all. They failed to focus their staffs and produce an executable plan due to their decisions to separate the combat planners from the post-hostilities planners and OPSEC concerns that killed effective coordination between Phase III and IV. In addition, replacement of the commander of SOUTHCOM just months before Operation JUST CAUSE and the commander of CENTCOM in the months immediately following the conclusion of Phase III in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM exacerbated an already difficult and complex planning environment. Neither commander prepared an adequate plan for Phase IV and the results speak for themselves. ii AbstractCombatant commander leadership is THE critical factor in ensuring robust, operational planning is done for post-hostilities (Phase IV). This can be seen by looking at the Phase IV failures in both Panama and Iraq. Both these Phase IV planning failures followed successful combat operations in Phase III, but the combatant commanders failed to ensure as much effort was put into Phase IV planning as Phase III. In fact, they failed to ensure there was any real plan...

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Section: The Secret Of Our Successfailurementioning

confidence: 99%

How to Fail at Post-Hostilities Planning at the Operational Level

Chowning¹

2009

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Introduction

Cited by 1 publication

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How to Fail at Post-Hostilities Planning at the Operational Level

How to Fail at Post-Hostilities Planning at the Operational Level

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