Introduction

Blatti, Stephan; Snowdon, Paul F.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0001

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…7 While he does accept the essentialist claim, Olson often characterizes animalism itself as the view that we are animals: "animalism does not say that we are animals essentially" (2007, p. 26). Other characterizations of animalism as the identity claim itself, with the essentialist thesis viewed as additional, include Blatti & Snowdon (2016, p. 2), Bailey (2015, p. 867), Blatti (2007, p. 596), and Snowdon (1990;2016, p. 266). 8 Olson (2015b.…”

Section: Who Are Animals?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Who are “we”?: Animalism and conjoined twins

Francescotti

2022

Philosophical Books

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Various cases of conjoined twinning have been presented as problems for the animalist view that we are animals. In some actual and possible cases of human dicephalus that have been discussed in the literature, it is arguable that there are two persons but only one human animal. It is also tempting to believe that there are two persons and one animal in possible instances of craniopagus parasiticus that have been described. Here

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Section: Who Are Animals?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Who are “we”?: Animalism and conjoined twins

Francescotti

2022

Philosophical Books

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“…A more preferable interpretation of the non-contingent role of the body in both the species and individual identity of a human being is numerical identity. A living human body is necessary for the identity of a human being because a particular human being (an individual member of Homo sapiens ) is strictly numerically identical with a particular living human body (van Inwagen 1980 ; Snowdon 1990 ; Olson 1997 ; Blatti and Snowdon 2016 ). The biological processes within that body, which are determined by the biological makeup of the Homo sapiens (species identity), sustain the experiences and interactions between that human being, its environment and itself, and in this way they play a central role in the emergence of the unique identity of a particular human being.…”

Section: The Human Being and The Human Bodymentioning

confidence: 99%

Leaving gift-giving behind: the ethical status of the human body and transplant medicine

Łuków

2018

Med Health Care and Philos

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The paper argues that the idea of gift-giving and its associated imagery, which has been founding the ethics of organ transplants since the time of the first successful transplants, should be abandoned because it cannot effectively block arguments for (regulated) markets in human body parts. The imagery suggests that human bodies or their parts are transferable objects which belong to individuals. Such imagery is, however, neither a self-evident nor anthropologically unproblematic construal of the relation between a human being and their body. The paper proposes an alternative conceptualization of that relation, the identity view according to which a human being is identical with their living body. This view, which offers a new ethical perspective on some central concepts of transplant medicine and its ethical and legal standards and institutions, supports widely shared intuitive ethical judgments. On this proposal, an act of selling a human body or one of its parts is an act of trade in human beings, not in owned objects. Transfers of human body parts for treatment purposes are to be seen as sharing in another human being's misfortune rather than as giving owned objects. From the perspective of policy-making, the proposal requires, first, that informed consent for removal of transplant material be obtained from the potential benefactor. Secondly, explicit consent by the prospective benefactor is obligatory in the case of removal of transplant material from a living benefactor. Thirdly, in the case of posthumous retrieval, informed consent by the potential benefactor during their life is not ethically indispensable. Additionally, while refusal of posthumous retrieval expressed by a potential benefactor during their life must be respected, such a refusal needs ethical justification and explanation.

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“…Hull 1978). Discussions over 'animalism' (the view that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that we persist as animals; see Blatti and Snowdon 2016) illustrate this tension between 'vertebrate-centrism' and wider approaches to what organisms are (Dupré 2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

Ontologies of Living Beings: Introduction

Ferner

Pradeu

2017

Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology

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Though the history of the interactions between 'biology' and metaphysics is almost as old as Western philosophy itself (Lennox 2001), it seems fair to say that there has been a resurgence of interest in this connection in the last couple of decades (e.g. Hull 1989;Millstein 2009;Clarke 2011;Dupré 2012;Pradeu 2012;Godfrey-Smith 2013;Ferner 2016;Wiggins 2016). Rediscovering this connection brings both opportunities and challenges.Take, for example, the recent suggestions by certain philosophers of biology, especially John Dupré and co-workers (Dupré 2012), to shift towards a processual view of the living world. The shift, wherein organisms are to be considered processes rather than 'things,' is a dramatic and generative one. However, those readers more firmly positioned within the sphere of analytic metaphysics will know the kinds of objections that processual accounts excite, e.g., from substance-led Aristotelians. Organisms, the Aristotelian says, are substances that undergo processes, but do not exemplify them. (For more general arguments for and against process-based ontologies, see Seibt 2013;Wiggins 2016.) Albeit prominent, this is just one of many controversies about the metaphysical character of living beings. As originally envisaged, the aim of this special issue was to flesh out this debate alongside others, where the fields of biology, philosophy of biology, and metaphysics overlap. More generally, we had thought to bring together a series of papers examining the various frameworks, or 'ontologies,' within which one can pick out biological individuals (and to examine the relationships between these ontological frameworks). In certain respects, we hope, this special issue displays some of the successes of this project.It is easy, however, to become overly beholden to ambitions of 'success'-and, as editors, we have found our failures just as, if not more, valuable and interesting.Our intention for the issue was to bring together contributors from across the philosophical spectrum, to try to nurture dialogue between them on these topics; we asked philosophers of biology, analytic metaphysicians, and historians of science to help us examine the different ways that biological reality can be partitioned. Though strictly speaking they are sub-disciplines, the modes of inquiry and characteristic questions of these areas are sufficiently different for us to label this project 'interdisciplinary' (though others might prefer the term 'multidisciplinary').Yet interdisciplinarity is difficult. We enter this here not as an excuse (though perhaps we should), but because it's important to emphasize why exactly it is so difficult. We are convinced

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Introduction

Cited by 6 publications

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Who are “we”?: Animalism and conjoined twins

Who are “we”?: Animalism and conjoined twins

Leaving gift-giving behind: the ethical status of the human body and transplant medicine

Ontologies of Living Beings: Introduction

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