Introduction: Extra-Legal Measures and the Problem of Legitimacy

Fatovic, Clement; Kleinerman, Benjamin A.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199965533.003.0001

Cited by 3 publications

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“…Most studies imply that bureaucrats' power stems from their ability to apply the law or not, or to choose between different ways of implementing it, in order to govern the behaviour of their 'clients'. In contrast, this article brings attention to cases when the government of behaviour cannot stem from law or discretion alone and street-level bureaucrats need to deploy 'extra-legal' strategies as a policy instrument on a permanent basis (Fatovic and Kleinerman 2013).…”

Section: Bureaucratic Persuasion Freedom and The Limits Of The Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performing freedom in the Dutch deportation regime: bureaucratic persuasion and the enforcement of ‘voluntary return’

Cleton

Chauvin

2019

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

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How do states relate to undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers once they have been formally rejected? A growing amount of research has been devoted to the role of government and NGO workers in executing soft-deportation policy through 'voluntary return' programmes. Many of these studies convincingly argue that voluntary return most often is anything but voluntary. However, less effort has been spent answering the question of why, then, departure is still constructed as voluntary and how this construction is realised in practice. This paper explores the work of street-level bureaucrats in charge of expelling unauthorised immigrants from the Netherlands in case expulsion cannot stem from the law alone and deportation workers deploy extra-legal strategies to carry out exclusionary policy goals. In these cases, we show that, in addition to building trust relationships with migrants, government and NGO workers ostensibly emphasise their clients' self-determination and agency. By examining the performative construction of 'voluntariness' in highly asymmetrical interview rituals, this article brings attention to an under-theorised condition of the conduct of conduct in the era of governmentality: if modern bureaucratic power, however punitive, must govern primarily by addressing the freedom of free agents, then it must ensure the interpretation of conduct as voluntary.

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Section: Bureaucratic Persuasion Freedom and The Limits Of The Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performing freedom in the Dutch deportation regime: bureaucratic persuasion and the enforcement of ‘voluntary return’

Cleton

Chauvin

2019

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

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“…With the imprimatur of this doyen of early constitutional design, the idea of laying the groundwork for an "imperial presidency" (Schlesinger 1973) for many in the constituent assembly was positively exciting. 2 Though the idea of wielding "power without persuasion" (Howell 2003) had a whiff of royal prerogative about it (see Fatovic & Kleinerman 2013, Poole 2015, it inspired confidence, not dread, in the founders' circle. Gone was Americans' fear of sovereign dictatorship that had caused so many of them to flee the British monarchy.…”

Section: "A Wide-spreading Monarchy"mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…During the last 20 years or so, all three of these options have been studied in depth, at length, and with great sophistication (see, inter alia, Dyzenhaus 2006, Fatovic 2009, Gross & Ní Aoláin 2006, Honig 2009, Lazar 2009, Loevy 2016, Ramraj 2008, Sarat 2010). I will not herein rehearse abstractions about regimes of exception.…”

Section: Emergency Constitutionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutional Dictatorships, from Colonialism to COVID-19

Meierhenrich

2021

Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci.

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In this article, I use the concept of constitutional dictatorship as a heuristic, as a way of thinking more explicitly about constitutional violence than is customary in comparative constitutional law. Constitutional dictatorship is an epic concept. It is capable of illuminating—and retelling—epic histories of constitutional law, of alerting us to commonalities in constitutional practices of domination—and thus of violence—that would otherwise remain shrouded in legal orientalism. The analysis aspires to make constitutional law strange again. To this end, I trace nomoi and narratives of constitutional dictatorship from colonialism to the coronavirus pandemic. Arguing against emergency scripts, I relate the idea of “emergency” to the everyday and both to coloniality. Mine is a rudimentary conceptual history—a Begriffsgeschichte—of constitutional dictatorship. I think of the empirical vignettes about crisis government in the colony/postcolony on which my comparative historical analysis is based as prolegomena to a critical theory of constitutional dictatorship.

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Emergencia y Jurisdicción Constitucional

Vargas

2023

Rule of Law and the Challenges Posed by the Pandemic

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Introduction: Extra-Legal Measures and the Problem of Legitimacy

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Performing freedom in the Dutch deportation regime: bureaucratic persuasion and the enforcement of ‘voluntary return’

Performing freedom in the Dutch deportation regime: bureaucratic persuasion and the enforcement of ‘voluntary return’

Constitutional Dictatorships, from Colonialism to COVID-19

Emergencia y Jurisdicción Constitucional

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