Introduction

Khan, Mushtaq; Jomo, K. S.

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139085052.001

Cited by 26 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The heterodox economics literature has taken a different standpoint on the role of the political regime to mediate the effect of corruption on growth. It has argued that corruption is unlikely to negatively affect economic growth, especially in autocracies (Khan and Jomo, 2000). In some autocratic regimes, where ruling elites may have long-term time horizons, politicians are able to make the credible commitments to firms not to expropriate all of the rents that accrue from the investment decision, though some rent-sharing may exist in the form of bribes from firms to politicians (Bardhan, 1997; Khan 1996).…”

Section: The Relationship Between Corruption Political Regimes and Ementioning

confidence: 99%

The corruption–growth relationship: does the political regime matter?

Saha

Sen

2020

Journal of Institutional Economics

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Corruption is widely believed to have an adverse effect on the economic performance of a country. However, many East-and-Southeast-Asian countries either achieved or currently are achieving impressively rapid economic growth despite widespread corruption – the so-called East-Asian-Paradox. A common feature of these countries was that they were autocracies. We re-examine the corruption-growth relationship, in light of the East-Asian-Paradox. We examine the role of political regimes, in mediating corruption–growth relationship using panel data over 100 countries for the period 1984–2016. We find clear evidence that corruption–growth relationship differs by the type of political regime, and the growth-enhancing effect of corruption is more likely in autocracies than in democracies. The marginal effect analysis shows that in strongly autocratic countries, higher corruption may lead to significantly higher growth, while this is not the case in democracies. Alternatively, democracy is not good for growth if there is a high level of perceived corruption. We provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism by which corruption is growth-enhancing in autocracies is through the perceived credibility of the commitment of ruling political elites to economic freedom, thereby providing confidence to the firms to invest, leading to long-term growth.

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Section: The Relationship Between Corruption Political Regimes and Ementioning

confidence: 99%

The corruption–growth relationship: does the political regime matter?

Saha

Sen

2020

Journal of Institutional Economics

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“…As noted by Khan and Jomo (2000: 9–10), Mauro’s results should be interpreted with much care. The trends captured by the regression line are driven by two groups of countries: on the one hand, the numerous stagnating or slow-growing developing countries where, due to social fragmentation and underdevelopment, neopatrimonial forms of social organization are deep-seated and corruption is rife (see Scott, 1972: 114–18); on the other, the group of advanced capitalist countries where corruption is low (or at least non-endemic) and growth rates moderately high.…”

Section: The Economic Effects Of Corruption: Theory and Evidencementioning

confidence: 75%

“…To provide a superior account of the empirical evidence on corruption and growth, this article reviews and codifies an emerging body of literature that transcends the narrow assumptions of mainstream accounts of corruption, and theorizes much more carefully the social structures within which corrupt transactions take place. This literature—emerging from the work of Khan and Jomo (2000), North et al (2009, 2012) and, more recently, Wedeman (2012)—examines the distribution of power, the structure of patron–client networks and the configuration of state–business relations as the key determinants of the economic effects of corruption. Formerly, the study of these socio-political dimensions had remained confined within the vast literature on clientelism in sociology and political science (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ‘sociological turn’ in corruption studies: Why fighting graft in the developing world is often unnecessary, and sometimes counterproductive

Uberti

2016

Progress in Development Studies

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Since the mid-1990s, an ‘anticorruption consensus’ has emerged in international development policy: because corruption is taken to be invariably deleterious for investment and growth, eliminating or reducing corruption has come to be seen as a necessary precondition for development. This article takes issue with the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of this proposition. To do so, it reviews and codifies an emerging strand of literature that transcends the narrow assumptions of economic models of corruption and theorizes much more carefully the social structures within which corruption takes place. This body of research, which heralds a ‘sociological turn’ in corruption studies, provides a robust framework to account for the economic effects of corruption in specific country contexts and suggests that fighting corruption per se might not always be necessary for development; in fact, it might sometimes prove counterproductive.

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“…The organic acids, carbonic acid and chelating substances produced during decomposition help in the liberation of phosphate from rock phosphate. Khan and Joergensen (2009) reported the increased in different fraction of phosphorus in compost due to application of inorganic P fertilizer during composting. The composting with RP had significantly higher citrate soluble P compared to straw compost without RP (Biswas and Narayansamy, 2006).…”

Section: Total Phosphorus Water Soluble Phosphorus and Citrate Soluble Phosphorusmentioning

confidence: 99%