Introduction: Nonparadigmatic Punishments

Coverdale, Helen Brown; Wringe, Bill

doi:10.1111/japp.12499

Cited by 1 publication

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“…In this paper, I focus on distributed responsibility in social interactions, thereby I support conceptualizing responsibility as distributed across a network of humans and machines [16]. It is also not clear from the outset whether responsibility can be divided up like a pizza, namely that one can infer the size of the share from the number of responsibility bearers [17].…”

Section: Responsibility On the Human Sidementioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed responsibility in human–machine interactions

Strasser

2021

AI Ethics

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Artificial agents have become increasingly prevalent in human social life. In light of the diversity of new human–machine interactions, we face renewed questions about the distribution of moral responsibility. Besides positions denying the mere possibility of attributing moral responsibility to artificial systems, recent approaches discuss the circumstances under which artificial agents may qualify as moral agents. This paper revisits the discussion of how responsibility might be distributed between artificial agents and human interaction partners (including producers of artificial agents) and raises the question of whether attributions of responsibility should remain entirely on the human side. While acknowledging a crucial difference between living human beings and artificial systems culminating in an asymmetric feature of human–machine interactions, this paper investigates the extent to which artificial agents may reasonably be attributed a share of moral responsibility. To elaborate on criteria that can justify a distribution of responsibility in certain human–machine interactions, the role of types of criteria (interaction-related criteria and criteria that can be deferred from socially constructed responsibility relationships) is examined. Thereby, the focus will lay on the evaluation of potential criteria referring to the fact that artificial agents surpass in some aspects the capacities of humans. This is contrasted with socially constructed responsibility relationships that do not take these criteria into account. In summary, situations are examined in which it seems plausible that moral responsibility can be distributed between artificial and human agents.

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Section: Responsibility On the Human Sidementioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed responsibility in human–machine interactions

Strasser

2021

AI Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Introduction: Nonparadigmatic Punishments

Cited by 1 publication

References 10 publications

Distributed responsibility in human–machine interactions

Distributed responsibility in human–machine interactions

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