Introduction—or What Does Moral Philosophy Know about Morality?

Experimental Philosophy of Technology

“…From a pragmatic point of view, it makes better sense to examine specific arguments and theories, and then to examine the presence or absence of intuitions in these arguments and theories-and only then to criticize or defend the role of such intuitions on a case-by-case basis. Given that intuitions in philosophizing 5 While I am sympathetic to a wider understanding and utilization of empirical methods in philosophy generally, for instance as it has been eloquently advocated by Hämäläinen (2016), and philosophy of technology more specifically, I limit myself in this paper to a conception of "empirical" and "empirical methodology" as it has been adopted within the field of experimental philosophy, thus retaining continuity. It seems to me that the acceptance and implementation of the methodology of experimental philosophy is already a significant-if not a final-step toward a more empirically informed philosophy of technology.…”

“…I follow Hartmann et al (2013) in rejecting the terms of the debate about whether philosophical questions are (or should be) impervious to empirical research, allowing instead that experimental methods can complement-rather than displace-more purely analytical methods. The goal should be to maintain the rigor of philosophical reflection and to make good use of empirical data, while at the same time avoiding empirical naivety (Hämäläinen, 2016). As I will show, research in the philosophy of technology stands to gain much from an explicit engagement with empirical research.…”

“…Second, the promising role of experimental methods in philosophy of technology has been too little appreciated. Despite a growing recognition that empirical methods and findings can play an important role in addressing philosophical questions (e.g., Appiah, 2008;Hämäläinen, 2016;Plakias, 2015), and notwithstanding the so-called empirical turn in philosophy of technology (e.g., Achterhuis, 2001;Scharff, 2011), systematic engagement with empirical research has been scarce in philosophy of technology, especially when compared to other disciplines. For instance, while research in experimental ethics has witnessed a proliferation of empirically informed normative work on a wide range of subjects (e.g., on the nature of character, well-being, and the good life), the methodologies and findings from these and related studies have rarely been extended to similar issues in ethics of technology.…”

“…I have chosen this methodology not only because it promises new insights and lines of research for philosophy of technology, but also because it importantly extends the project of experimental philosophy. Nevertheless, I do not think there is any reason why the positive project as I describe it could not accommodate those who seek to gain a richer understanding in philosophy of technology, for instance by investigating the "moral present"(Hämäläinen, 2016). In other words, should empirically minded researchers who are not experimentally inclined (in the sense given to this by experimental philosophy) wish to take on the positive project or identify with it, then they would be welcome indeed.…”

Inconsistency in Ethics

“…We can also see it at work, in different ways in the work of philosophers who in the 80s and 90s criticized the relative lack of historical sensibility in moral theory: Charles Taylor, Alastair MacIntyre and Bernard Williams, and, in a very different way, in in contemporary discussions on ex-phi. For discussion see Hämäläinen (2016, especially chapters 2–5).…”