Introduction: Perception Without Representation

Locatelli, Roberta; Wilson, Keith A.

doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9460-1

Cited by 44 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 82 publications

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“…Ирония ситуации состоит в том, что репрезентационизм, на первый взгляд, лучше справляется с рассматриваемой задачей. Дело в том, что понятие репрезентационального содержания хорошо подходит для того, чтобы служить связующим звеном между двумя разновидностями знания -неважно, прибегают ли при этом к мифическому понятию неконцептуального содержания или, напротив, подчёркивают неизбежную концептуальную обусловленность любого типа знания 100 . Здесь сразу можно возразить, что этот видимый успех репрезентационизма связан с подменой прямого знания непрямым, что во многом сводит его на нет.…”

Section: IIunclassified

The Noumenal Morass: Post-Kantian Representationalism and Its Relationalist Critique in the Light of Strong Disjunctivism

Bandurin¹

2021

Vox. Philosophical Journal

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This epistemological essay addresses the issue of representational content’s existence in the case of true direct knowledge. Contrary answers to it are considered as a basis for the distinction between representationalism and relationalism. The first part of the essay contains a critical analysis of the fundamental features of German Idealism as a kind of representationalism, which determined the main epistemological trend of continental philosophy in the form of post-Kantian representationalism. In the second part, after a brief excursion into certain contemporary continental issues, the current discussion between representationalism and relationalism in analytical philosophy is considered. It is concluded that relationalism, while correctly recognizing the nature of direct perception as being without representational content, is incapable of ensuring the unity of direct perception and a perceptual judgment, and a solution is proposed that could lead out of this epistemological impasse.

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Section: IIunclassified

The Noumenal Morass: Post-Kantian Representationalism and Its Relationalist Critique in the Light of Strong Disjunctivism

Bandurin¹

2021

Vox. Philosophical Journal

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“…Any time our knowledge doesn't accurately model its referent we say things are not as they 'seem' to us " (Allsop, 2010:199). Locatelli and Wilson (2017) write that:…”

Section: The Representational Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Being Somewhere

Tjostheim

Waterworth

2021

The Psychosocial Reality of Digital Travel

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To understand the experience of being present somewhere else, via a digital environment, we start by considering how we can experience being anywhere. We present several different philosophical and psychological perspectives on this, stressing the importance of perception. Each has something to offer and add to our understanding of digital travel. We compare four philosophical views: representationalism, relationism, enactivism and the sense-data view. Each has its strengths and weaknesses, but relationism is best placed to accommodate perceptual illusions, which is a prevalent view of the psychological nature of telepresence experiences. As suggested by enactivism and the direct perception approach, the possibilities for action in the world are important to the nature of our experience of places. This, in turn, is influenced by the characteristics of the world in which we act, through affordances.

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“…Instead, what characterizes a mental state as a state of recollective memory is, for the representationalist, the fact that it puts us in an intentional relation to the past, that is, a relation of representing those events. 3 Thus, to illustrate with an example, what makes my memory of my tenth birthday party a memory of that event, and what accounts for the fact that I experience that memory as a memory of 2 For a more detailed discussion of why relational views of perception are incompatible with representational views, see Crane (2006); Genone (2016); Locatelli and Wilson (2017). In what follows, I will take it for granted that one of the motivations for developing a relational account of memory is to avoid a representationalist account.…”

Section: The Relational View Of Memorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Unsuccessful Remembering: A Challenge for the Relational View of Memory

Sant’Anna

2020

Erkenn

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This paper explores the relationship between a prominent version of the relational view of memory and recent work on forms of unsuccessful remembering or memory errors. I argue that unsuccessful remembering poses an important challenge for the relational view.Unsuccessful remembering can be divided into two kinds: misremembering and confabulating. I discuss each of these cases in light of a recent relational account, according to which remembering is characterized by an experiential relation to past events, and I argue that experiential relations do not adequately distinguish between successful and unsuccessful remembering. This is because there are, on the one hand, cases of remembering that do not instantiate the relevant experiential relations, and, on the other hand, cases of confabulation and misremembering that do instantiate the relevant experiential relations. I conclude by suggesting that any successful relationalist attempt to explain remembering needs to come to grips with unsuccessful remembering.

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Introduction: Perception Without Representation

Cited by 44 publications

References 82 publications

The Noumenal Morass: Post-Kantian Representationalism and Its Relationalist Critique in the Light of Strong Disjunctivism

The Noumenal Morass: Post-Kantian Representationalism and Its Relationalist Critique in the Light of Strong Disjunctivism

Being Somewhere

Unsuccessful Remembering: A Challenge for the Relational View of Memory

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