Abstract:This paper builds a three part argument in favour of a more transcendentally focused form of 'postphenomenology' than is currently practised in philosophy of technology. It does so by problematising two key terms, 'constitution' and 'postphenomenology', then by arguing in favour of a 'transcendental empiricist' approach that draws on the work of Foucault, Derrida, and, in particular, Deleuze.Part one examines 'constitution', as it moves from the context of Husserl's phenomenology to Ihde and Verbeek's 'postphenomenology'. I argue that the term tends towards different senses in these contexts, and that this renders its sense more problematic than the work of Ihde and Verbeek makes it appear. Part two examines 'postphenomenology'. I argue that putatively 'poststructuralist' thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze may be better characterised as 'postphenomenologists', and that approaching them in this way may allow better access to their work from a philosophy of technology perspective. Part three argues for a 'transcendental empiricist' approach to philosophy of technology. In doing so, it argues for a rewriting of contemporary philosophy of technology's political constitution: since an 'empirical turn' in the 1990s, I argue, philosophy of technology has been too narrowly focused on 'empirical' issues of fact, and not focused enough on 'transcendental' issues concerning conditions for these facts.
Keywords:'postphenomenology'; 'Ihde'; 'Verbeek'; 'Deleuze'; 'transcendental empiricism'; 'transcendental turn'. This paper builds a three part argument in favour of a more transcendentally focused form of 'postphenomenology' than is currently practised in philosophy [p 534] of technology. It does so by problematising two key terms, 'constitution' and 'postphenomenology', then by arguing in favour of a 'transcendental empiricist' approach that draws on the work of Foucault, Derrida, and, in particular, Deleuze.The first part focuses on the term 'constitution', with attention to how its sense changes as we move from the context of Husserl's phenomenology to that of 'postphenomenology', as advanced by Ihde (1993 Selinger 2006a) and Verbeek (2005Verbeek ( , 2011. This aim of this part is quite restricted:to argue that 'constitution' tends towards different senses in the contexts described, and that this renders the term more problematic than the work of Ihde and Verbeek makes it appear. The second 2 part focuses on the term 'postphenomenology' itself. The aim of this part is to argue that putatively 'poststructuralist' thinkers like Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze may in fact be better described as 'postphenomenologists'. This claim is in some ways consonant with Ihde's own attempts to ascribe a phenomenological genealogy to poststructuralist thinkers, as when he situates Derrida and Foucault in terms of what he calls 'edifying phenomenology ' (1986: 192-193); however, it also goes beyond this by placing greater emphasis on the importance of a linguistic turn in the work of Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze. The t...