Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union

Delreux, Tom; Adriaensen, Johan

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_1

Cited by 48 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 61 publications

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“…The model has been used as a middle‐range theory (Pollack, 2003) or heuristic tool rather than as a fully fledged theory, and is helpful to ‘reduce complexity in real‐life political processes’ and to ‘make sense of certain aspects of EU policy‐making’ (Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017, p. 10). This body of literature is helpful to understand the divisions of power within the EU (Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017) but also the dynamics of the relations between the Commission and member states. A PA analysis is therefore expected to shed light on whether, when it comes to IGAs, the Commission will satisfy the member states’ preferences or its own preferences instead.…”

Section: Theoretical and Methodological Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of the Commission in Intergovernmental Agreements in the Field of Energy. A Foot in the Door Technique?

Batzella

2021

J of Common Market Studies

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The European Commission has been active in proposing legislation on the exchange of information on Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) in the field of energy, pushing for an ex ante control mechanism which most member states have been reluctant to accept. This article aims to explain the extent to which and the conditions under which the Commission has been able to achieve its IGAs objectives. It argues that they have been achieved to a considerable extent due to the ability of the Commission to build on its agenda-setting powers and the preference alignment of member states. The article offers a thorough analysis of two consecutive legislative processes: the first leading to Decision 994/2012 and the second repealing the former and leading to Decision 2017/684. The analysis builds on legislative documents, secondary sources and data collected during two rounds of interviews in 2013 and 2018.

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Section: Theoretical and Methodological Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of the Commission in Intergovernmental Agreements in the Field of Energy. A Foot in the Door Technique?

Batzella

2021

J of Common Market Studies

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“…the member states) in the chain fulfil the roles of principal and agent simultaneously. Societal interests and firms with a potential stake in this policy field have no formal decision-making authority in democratic political systems, meaning they do not act as principals, but can be best qualified as 'endorsers' as they can 'alert political actors to the consequences of various policies' (Milner 1997, 60;Delreux and Adriaensen 2017) and 'declare one's (public) approval or support of' (Oxford Dictionaries 2012). They are thus 'signalers' that provide interest-driven knowledge by which they can exert pressure on political actors and shape the latter's choices.…”

Section: State Of Play: Which Role For Regional Authorities?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The European Union conducts its external economic policies towards third (non-EU) countries under close scrutiny of its member-states. One the one hand, the latter have delegated rulemaking powers to the EU-level, while on the other hand, they have opted to keep tight control over EU politics and policies (Delreux and Adriaensen 2017). This act of delegation from member states to the European Union has been studied in the Principal-Agent literature on the European Union (see for example Delreux and Adriaensen 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Principals and transceivers: regional authorities in EU trade negotiations

Kersschot

Kerremans

Bièvre

2020

Political Research Exchange

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The EU conducts its external trade policy under close scrutiny by member-states. Yet, what about the role of regional authorities in federal states? To answer, we look at the principal-agent chain of delegation and explore to which extent regions with stakes and competencies in the matter exert control over EU policies. We distinguish three ideal-type roles regions can perform: principals in their own right, members of collective principals, and introduce the new concept of 'transceivers'. A region can perform the role of principal with formal competencies, as does Flanders, which as one of multiple principals can withhold a Belgian decision. A region can also be one of a collective group of principals, as is the case for the region Hesse. Regions can finally perform the role of a 'transceiver' of information from policy-makers to constituencies (and vice versa), akin to the role of endorser, without formal framework for involvementas does Scotland. Since regions and states alike depend on private sector information, two conclusions prevail. First, despite formal competencies, regions that are members of collective principals struggle becoming the sole interlocutor for the private sector. Second, despite lacking competencies, transceiver-regions are crucial interlocutors complementing member-state control over EU trade policy.

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“…Therefore, the principal has to devise mechanisms to control agent's potentially excessive arbitrary or opportunistic behaviour. Derails in agency is called agency loss (Pollack, 1997), slack (Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017) or shirking (Kassim and Menon, 2003). Inevitably, cost incurred to put in place efficient control mechanisms shall not override benefits of delegation for the principal.…”

Section: P-a Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…his paper attempts to expand the scope of studying micro-delegation (Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017) meaning P-A relations under an individual EU policy area such as cohesion policy. Thus, the paper contributes to the limited scholarship employing the P-A framework in cohesion policy which by now focuses mostly on control mechanisms in implementation (Blom-hansen, 2005;Bachtler and Ferry, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information and Consultancy Centres in Slovakia – Promoting Partnership in Cohesion Policy

Jašurek¹

2020

LIMEN - International Scientific-Business Conference - Leadership, Innovation, Management and Economics: Integrated Politics Of

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Implementation of cohesion policy, as the major EU budgetary chapter, is subject to vast scholarship. Therefore, surprisingly enough, the principal-agent (P-A) framework has received little recognition in this academic field so far. The present paper contributes to the expansion of this increasingly popular approach also into cohesion scholarship by examining the operation of Information and Consultancy Centres (ICC) in Slovakia. The major finding shows limits of the P-A framework by suggesting that instead of a mutual conflict, it is a cooperative mode dominantly shaping dynamics of P-A relations due to the shared goals and interests. ICC operations and relations with the Government are interpreted via observational equivalence and ceremonialism as the recognized P-A framework tools.

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Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union

Cited by 48 publications

References 61 publications

The Role of the Commission in Intergovernmental Agreements in the Field of Energy. A Foot in the Door Technique?

The Role of the Commission in Intergovernmental Agreements in the Field of Energy. A Foot in the Door Technique?

Principals and transceivers: regional authorities in EU trade negotiations

Information and Consultancy Centres in Slovakia – Promoting Partnership in Cohesion Policy

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