Intruders in the Grid

Liu, Chen‐Ching; Ştefanov, Alexandru; Hong, Junho; Panciatici, Patrick

doi:10.1109/mpe.2011.943114

Cited by 102 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Liu et al [10] have shown that an intelligent adversary with knowledge of the power system model can corrupt a carefully selected set of sensor data to introduce arbitrary errors in the estimates of certain state variables without triggering an alarm from the BDD. A wrong state estimator output can, for example, falsely indicate a significant voltage drop (hike) in a bus, triggering the utility to inject more (less) reactive power to the bus, which may in turn have a catastrophic effect on the stable operation of the grid [9].…”

Section: Rogue Device Installationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-secure communication architecture for active power distribution networks

Tesfay

Hubaux

Boudec

et al. 2014

Proceedings of the 29th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing

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Active power distribution networks require sophisticated monitoring and control strategies for efficient energy management and automatic adaptive reconfiguration of the power infrastructure. Such requirements are realised by deploying a large number of various electronic automation and communication field devices, such as Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) or Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), and a reliable two-way communication infrastructure that facilitates transfer of sensor data and control signals. In this paper, we perform a detailed threat analysis in a typical active distribution network's automation system. We also propose mechanisms by which we can design a secure and reliable communication network for an active distribution network that is resilient to insider and outsider malicious attacks, natural disasters, and other unintended failure. The proposed security solution also guarantees that an attacker is not able to install a rogue field device by exploiting an emergency situation during islanding.

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Section: Rogue Device Installationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-secure communication architecture for active power distribution networks

Tesfay

Hubaux

Boudec

et al. 2014

Proceedings of the 29th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing

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“…The security domain and user management mechanism are adopted in IEC 61850 protocols to prevent unauthorized access and mitigate the potential impact of a successful intruder [5]. Since the highly intelligent malware, like stuxnet, could infect the physical isolated computer networks via USB drive [6], the second line of defense, intrusion detection system (IDS) is highly preferred [7]. ID is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer network to detect the malicious intruder, and hence, attempting to stop detecting possible incidents.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Digital Watermark based Authentication for Intrusion Detection of Digital Substations

Zhao¹,

Qiangqiang²

2014

TOEEJ

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Abstract:The paper proposes the use of digital watermark based authentication for intrusion detection in IEC 61850-automated substations. The watermark can be embedded into the Least Significant Bits of the measurements without visible deterioration in precision. When Intelligent Electronics Devices gets measurements, the watermark in the measurement can be retrieved to determine whether it has been attacked and detect malicious intrusion. The proposed approach is appropriate for the time critical and resource constrained applications in substation automation system for its simplicity. Numerical simulation shows that the process latency and error incurred by watermarking is acceptable and will not impact performance of protective function in IEC 61850 automated substations.

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“…The information and communication technology (ICT) and power infrastructures represent a large and complex cyberphysical system [3]. Previous research considered the cyber system and power system as separate entities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Frameworks that integrate the power devices and communication networks for agent-based backup protection and special protection schemes were proposed in [5], [6]. Testbeds for cyber security of SCADA systems are reported in [3], [7]- [9]. However, there is a lack of co-simulation of power grids with their entire SCADA models and the control hierarchy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

ICT modeling for integrated simulation of cyber-physical power systems

Ştefanov

Liu

2012

2012 3rd IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe (ISGT Europe)

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A cyber-physical system is a large and complex infrastructure. Due to the increasing connectivity, the power and cyber systems become more interdependent. Models of the interactions are needed between the power devices and information and communication technology (ICT). A broad range of cyber attacks has become a serious concern. Cyber attacks must be simulated to analyze the consequences on the power grid. Thus, the cyber system must be modeled explicitly and integrated with the power grid model. This paper describes the development and simulation of a novel co-simulation framework that integrates both the cyber and power systems. The objective is to implement the ICT model for real-time interactions with both the power grid and transmission operator. Different industrial grade environments have been developed to simulate the cyber-power interactions. ICT events that may affect the stability of the grid, e.g., cyber attacks, are simulated at the cyber system layer, and their impact analysis is conducted at the power system layer. The proposed co-simulation framework is validated with the IEEE 39-bus system.Index Terms-Cyber-physical system, cyber security, SCADA systems.

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Intruders in the Grid

Cited by 102 publications

References 1 publication

Cyber-secure communication architecture for active power distribution networks

Cyber-secure communication architecture for active power distribution networks

Digital Watermark based Authentication for Intrusion Detection of Digital Substations

ICT modeling for integrated simulation of cyber-physical power systems

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