Intuitive physics in action and judgment: The development of knowledge about projectile motion.

Abstract

This article contrasts intuitive knowledge about projectile motion expressed in action with knowledge expressed in explicit judgments. In the action condition of Experiment 1 children and adults threw a ball horizontally from different heights to hit targets on the floor; in the judgment condition the same subjects rated the respective launch speeds required. All age groups appropriately varied the launch speed with respect to both height of release and target distance in the action condition. In the judgment condition, however, kindergartners failed to integrate the relevant dimensions and even fourth graders and adults showed misconceptions of the speed-height relation. Experiment 2 established that the speed gradations in the action condition did not critically depend on visual flight feedback or the availability of outcome information. We conclude that perceptual-motor knowledge about projectile motion is distinct from naive, verbal-cognitive concepts of projectile motion and follows different developmental courses.

Impetus beliefs as default heuristics: Dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge about motion

“…For instance, Hubbard suggests that implicit knowledge reflects internalization of invariant physical principles, whereas explicit knowledge about motion may be less accurate. Similarly, Krist et al (1993) suggested that perceptually based knowledge is more accurate than verbal concepts of motion.…”

“…Several studies have suggested that from daily interactions with moving objects, people develop perceptually based knowledge about motion that is much more accurate than their naive verbal-cognitive concepts of motion and that this implicit knowledge follows a different developmental course (e.g., Krist, Fieberg, & Wilkening, 1993). Similarly, Freyd (1987) originally suggested that our implicit intuitive knowledge about motion, as measured in RM studies, reflects internalization of physical principles.…”

Physical Imagery: Kinematic versus Dynamic Models

“…For situations where it is reasonable to suppose that beliefs can influence imagery, a useful method for verifying the presence of imagery is to show that people do not have beliefs that could fully imitate imagery outcomes (e.g., Finke, 1985;Kosslyn, 1980). Krist, Fieberg, and Wilkening (1993), for example, showed that 5-year-olds do not correctly answer questions about where an object will land if it is pushed off a ledge. Children believe that the higher an object's release point, the faster it must be pushed to reach a given target.…”

Implicit Learning in Children Is Not Related to Age: Evidence from Drawing Behavior

“…Implicit learning has been seen as responsible for at least some aspects of first-language (e.g., Chandler, 1993) and second-language learning (e.g., Carr & Curran, 1994), category elaboration, reading and writing acquisition, adaptation to the physical constraints of the world (e.g., Krist, Fieberg, & Wilkening, 1993), and acquisition of social skills (Reber, 1993). Most of this learning takes place during infancy and childhood and constitutes the essential core of what a newborn must acquire to become an adult.…”