Investigating the Cybersecurity of Smart Grids Based on Cyber-Physical Twin Approach

Abstract

While the increasing penetration of information and communication technology into distribution grid brings numerous benefits, it also opens up a new threat landscape, particularly through cyberattacks. To provide a basis for countermeasures against such threats, this paper addresses the investigation of the impact and manifestations of cyberattacks on smart grids by replicating the power grid in a secure, isolated, and controlled laboratory environment as a cyber-physical twin. Currently, detecting intrusions by unauthorized third parties into the central monitoring and control system of grid operators, especially attacks within the grid perimeter, is a major challenge. The development and validation of methods to detect and prevent coordinated and timed attacks on electric power systems depends not only on the availability and quality of data from such attack scenarios, but also on suitable realistic investigation environments. However, to create a comprehensive investigation environment, a realistic representation of the study object is required to thoroughly investigate critical cyberattacks on grid operations and evaluate their impact on the power grid using real data. In this paper, we demonstrate our cyber-physical twin approach using a microgrid in the context of a cyberattack case study.

The Kopernikus ENSURE Co-Demonstration Platform

“…This infrastructure allows, among others, the development, testing, and demonstration of innovative controllers or operational concepts for electric distribution grids. In order to implement operational concepts or controllers in the laboratory infrastructure, a real-time co-simulation framework is used as laboratory control, which is able to collect and exchange setpoints and measurement values with the distributed units using the Modbus protocol [40], [41].…”