Investigating the Development of the Internal and External Service Tasks of Non‐executive Directors: the case of the Netherlands (1997–2005)

Bezemer, Pieter–Jan; Maassen, Gregory; Bosch, Frans van den; Volberda, Henk

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00635.x

Cited by 39 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Model 3a, Model 3b and 3c model also showed an increase of respectively 3.2% and 3.9% of the company's performance. These findings are consistent with evidence from Bezemer et al (2007Bezemer et al ( , 2012 in their study in the Netherlands with the finding that the two boards gave wider opportunities to the majority shareholders to play a role in overseeing the operations of the firm through a separate board up can have an impact on firm performance. Another reason that may be attributed to the above findings is the average equity holdings by individuals and families who are at a high level, which is 49.53% and is seen more concentrated compared to the situation in countries that have a system of a board (Kamal, 2010).…”

Section: The Effects Of Family Ownership On Firm Performancesupporting

confidence: 81%

“…In the short term, this behavior will maintain the performance, while the performance of the firm can be done gradually in the long run. Consistent with this point, Bezemer et al (2007Bezemer et al ( , 2012 found in his study that the BOC members involved in controlling BOD managers can improve compliance and reduce the risk of failure but reduced in other firms focusing on innovation and research and development firms (Hendry & Kiel, 2004;Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). On the other hand, family involvement in the two boards reduces conflicts of interest between the BOC and BOD and provides a positive influence on firm performance.…”

Section: The Effect Of Family Involvement In Both Boards (Boc and Bodsupporting

confidence: 51%

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Two-tier board system and Indonesian family owned firms performance

Arifai¹,

Tran²,

Moslehpour³

et al. 2018

10.5267/j.msl

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The two-tier board system practiced in Indonesia provides greater opportunity for the majority shareholders to place representative on board which may expropriate interest of minority shareholders and increase information asymmetry. This study looks at the influence of family ownership on firm's performance, by differentiating the influence of family ownership from family involvement in companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Family ownership is measured based on family's equity ownership in the firm and family's involvement. This study explores family involvement in threefold: involvement in the board of commissioners, involvement in the board of directors and involvement in both boards. Firm performance is measured based on Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC) which comprises of capital employed efficiency, human capital efficiency, and structural capital efficiency. Data was collected for a period of three years from 2007 to 2009 on 155 firms which were identified as family firms. The findings show that family ownership has a positive influence on firm performance. Family involvement, however, shows mixed results. Family involvement in the board of commissioners has a positive but insignificant influence on firm's performance. Family involvement in the board of directors has a negative influence on firm's performance. Family involvement in both boards has a positive influence on firm performance. The findings suggest that family involvement in both boards creates a balance between the supervisory function and the management function, thus resulting in a more effective monitoring of firm's management.

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Section: The Effects Of Family Ownership On Firm Performancesupporting

confidence: 81%

Section: The Effect Of Family Involvement In Both Boards (Boc and Bodsupporting

confidence: 51%

Two-tier board system and Indonesian family owned firms performance

Arifai¹,

Tran²,

Moslehpour³

et al. 2018

10.5267/j.msl

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“…Corporate interlocking is a means of anticipating or controlling sources of uncertainty stemming from potentially disruptive unilateral actions of other corporations (Allen, 1974). Bezemer, Maassen, Van Den Bosch and Volberda (2007) explain that board interlocking can provide benefits to companies connected in a network, improving performance of organizations connected by sharing their directors. However, the relationships of the Board of Directors can compromise the independence of non-executive directors, generating conflicts of interest.…”

Section: Board Interlocking and Performance Of The Companiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do the Board of Directors Composition and the Board Interlocking Influence on Performance?

Vesco

Beuren

2016

BAR, Braz. Adm. Rev.

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This study analyzes the influence of composition of the Board of Directors and their social relations (board interlocking) on performance of Brazilian companies. A descriptive study based on documentary research was conducted with a total of 1,163 companies' observations and 18,119 standardized observations regarding directors. Simultaneous equations were applied to the data analysis. The survey results showed that, regarding the influence of composition of the Board of Directors on the performance of the companies, among variables used to identify its characteristics, that some showed endogeneity. Among the characteristics of the Board of Directors, the duality of the board was exogenous when comparing market performance (Tobin's Q) and the outsiders were also exogenous for internal performance (Return on Equity). Thus, the duality of the board is more influenced by the specificities of each company than by the market value of the companies. The characteristic outsiders are more influenced by the institutional environment than by the ROE. The practice of board interlocking proved to be insignificant in relation to the market value, indicating natural selection. Therefore, it is not possible to infer that the board interlocking can increase the dependency of the management, compromising the role of monitoring. Also, it is not possible to state that better positioned and central companies in the corporate relationships network show better performance.

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“…For more detailed descriptions of the Dutch corporate governance context, see Bezemer, Maassen, van den Bosch, and Volberda (), De Jong et al (), De Jong, Roell, and Westerhuis (), Groot (), Kabir et al (), and Van Ees et al ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Power and Paradigms: The Dutch Response to Pressures for Shareholder Value

Bezemer

Zajac

Naumovska

et al. 2014

Corporate Governance

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Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue In recent years, research aimed at identifying and relating the antecedents and consequences of diffusing organizational practices/ideas has turned its attention to debating the international adoption and implementation of the Anglo‐American model of corporate governance, i.e., a shareholder value orientation (SVO). While financial economists characterize the adoption of an SVO as necessary and performance‐enhancing, behavioral scientists have disputed such claims, invoking institutional contingencies in the appropriateness of an SVO. Our study seeks to provide some resolution to the debate by developing an overarching sociopolitical perspective that links the antecedents and consequences of the adoption of the contested practice of SVO. Research Findings/Insights We test our framework using extensive longitudinal data from 1992–2006 from the largest listed corporations in the Netherlands. We find a negative relationship between SVO adoption and subsequent firm performance, although this effect is attenuated when accompanied by greater SVO alignment among major owners and a firm's visible commitment to an SVO. Theoretical/Academic Implications This study extends prior research on the diffusion of contested organizational practices that has taken a sociopolitical perspective by offering an original contingency perspective that addresses how and why the misaligned preferences of corporate owners will affect (i) a company's inclination to espouse an SVO, and (ii) the performance consequences of such misalignment. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study suggests that, when board members are considering the adoption of new ideas/practices (e.g., SVO), they should consider the contextual fitness of the idea/practice with the firm's owners and their interests.

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Investigating the Development of the Internal and External Service Tasks of Non‐executive Directors: the case of the Netherlands (1997–2005)

Cited by 39 publications

References 55 publications

Two-tier board system and Indonesian family owned firms performance

Two-tier board system and Indonesian family owned firms performance

Do the Board of Directors Composition and the Board Interlocking Influence on Performance?

Power and Paradigms: The Dutch Response to Pressures for Shareholder Value

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