Investigation of Strength of E91 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

Begimbayeva, Yenlik; Zhaxalykov, Temirlan; Ussatova, Olga

doi:10.1109/opcs59592.2023.10275771

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…, h 32 , each of length log 2 256 = 8 bits. (3) Interpret each h j as an integer i j ∈ [0, 255], j = 1, . .…”

Section: Message Signing Algorithm (Action By the Sender)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, it is possible to implement quantum-resistant algorithms now and thereby protect critical data for decades to come. It is understood that transitioning to quantum-resistant cryptography is reasonable in cases where the value of the protected information exceeds the cost of its protection [3,4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[3 × 8]. -The external hash state r i has the same size as the input data block (24 bytes) and can be represented as a matrix of size [3 × 8].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Development of a New Post-Quantum Digital Signature Algorithm: Syrga-1

Algazy,

Sakan,

Khompysh

et al. 2024

Computers

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The distinguishing feature of hash-based algorithms is their high confidence in security. When designing electronic signature schemes, proofs of security reduction to certain properties of cryptographic hash functions are used. This means that if the scheme is compromised, then one of these properties will be violated. It is important to note that the properties of cryptographic hash functions have been studied for many years, but if a specific hash function used in a protocol turns out to be insecure, it can simply be replaced with another one while keeping the overall construction unchanged. This article describes a new post-quantum signature algorithm, Syrga-1, based on a hash function. This algorithm is designed to sign r messages with a single secret key. One of the key primitives of the signature algorithm is a cryptographic hash function. The proposed algorithm uses the HAS01 hashing algorithm developed by researchers from the Information Security Laboratory of the Institute of Information and Computational Technologies. The security and efficiency of the specified hash algorithm have been demonstrated in other articles by its authors. Hash-based signature schemes are attractive as post-quantum signature schemes because their security can be quantified, and their security has been proven.

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“…, h 32 , each of length log 2 256 = 8 bits. (3) Interpret each h j as an integer i j ∈ [0, 255], j = 1, . .…”

Section: Message Signing Algorithm (Action By the Sender)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Development of a New Post-Quantum Digital Signature Algorithm: Syrga-1

Algazy,

Sakan,

Khompysh

et al. 2024

Computers

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“…Quantum key generation protocol operates by utilizing a physical channel that allows the transmission of single photons between two protocol participants. However, the process of key generation itself requires the presence of a classical communication channel [2], [3], through which participants exchange public key information and subsequently conduct further information exchange. Thus, participants of the quantum protocol are connected both by a quantum communication network and a classical one.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approaches to Developing Key Distribution Protocols Based on Quantum Key Distribution

Begimbayeva Y.

2024

jes

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Quantum protocols for generating shared secret keys represent an effective method of ensuring secure information transmission using quantum communication channels. However, they are limited in scalability due to the physical constraints of quantum channels, which necessitates the use of classical communication channels for exchanging information between participants. This leads to the necessity of developing security threat models and network protection, especially in the case of hybrid networks, where quantum channels are used alongside classical ones. The peculiarity of constructing quantum key distribution protocols is associated with the costliness of implementation and implies the inevitable use of classical communication channels for key distribution. This paper addresses the task of ensuring the security of communication between subscribers not directly connected by quantum channels, through intermediary nodes, and analyzes threats from internal and external adversaries. Special attention is paid to situations where both types of adversaries have information about the processes and protocols in the network. The paper examines widely used key distribution protocols employed in practice. It describes the main security requirements applied to key distribution protocols, and presents the results of an analysis of the compliance of the discussed protocols with these requirements

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