Investigations of Power and EM Attacks on AES Implemented in FPGA

TEMPEST Comeback: A Realistic Audio Eavesdropping Threat on Mixed-signal SoCs

“…However, existing the EM SCCA methods have following innate limitations compared to TEMPEST in terms of practicability: (a) short key-recovery distance: the attack range is as far as several centimeters, (b) non-real-time: in order to get a cryptographic key, it cannot avoid warm-up time to capture and statistically analyze a lot of EM signal traces, (c) fragileness to interferences: the attack would fail if the frequency of the interesting EM signal coincides with that of a commercial radio or spurious signal, and (d) difficulty in hardware cryptography: even though there exist the successful attacks on some hardware cryptography implementations (i.e., ASIC [32] or FPGA [33,42]), the latest SoCs, which integrate a dedicated cryptographic engine, have not been successfully attacked yet to the best of our knowledge.…”