Investment Options and Bargaining Power: The Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas*

Hubert, Franz; Ikonnikova, Svetlana

doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2011.00447.x

Cited by 75 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Nord Stream's total strategic value for the initiators of the consortium, Wintershall and EON Ruhrgas of Germany and Gazprom of Russia (in our model Center and Russia), is huge. A gain of 4.5 percentage points translates into a gain of 7.6 bn e/a, which clearly exceeds the project's cost of 1.8 bn e/a (for similar results see Hubert & Ikonnikova (2003), Hubert & Ikonnikova (2011a), Hubert & Suleymanova (2008)). It is worth stressing that the project is profitable only because it increases the bargaining power of the consortium vis-a-vis other players.…”

Section: Nord Streammentioning

confidence: 73%

Pipeline Power: A Case Study of Strategic Network Investments

Hubert

Cobanli

2015

Review of Network Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. relevance at all, which appears to be at odds with the empirical evidence. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Section: Nord Streammentioning

confidence: 73%

Pipeline Power: A Case Study of Strategic Network Investments

Hubert

Cobanli

2015

Review of Network Economics

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“…It has been applied to natural gas by e.g. Hubert and Ikonnikova (2009) and Ikonnikova and Zwart (2010), and to CO 2 emissions by e.g. Albrecht et al (2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Transport of Captured $$\hbox {CO}_2$$ CO 2 : Who Can Gain and How Much?

Morbee

2014

Environ Resource Econ

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If carbon capture and storage (CCS) is to become a viable option for low-carbon power generation, its deployment will require the construction of dedicated CO 2 transport infrastructure. In a scenario of large-scale deployment of CCS in Europe by 2050, the optimal (cost-minimising) CO 2 transport network would consist of large international bulk pipelines from the main CO 2 source regions to the CO 2 sinks in hydrocarbon fields and saline aquifers, which are mostly located in the North Sea. In this paper, we use a Shapley value approach to analyse the multilateral negotiation process that would be required to develop such jointly optimised CO 2 infrastructure. First, we find that countries with excess storage capacity capture 38-45 % of the benefits of multilateral coordination, implying that the resource rent of a depleted hydrocarbon field (when used for CO 2 storage) is roughly $1 per barrel of original recoverable oil reserves, or $2 per boe (barrel of oil equivalent) of original recoverable gas reserves. This adds 25-600 % to current estimates of CO 2 storage cost. Second, countries with a strategic transit location capture 19 % of the rent in the case of national pipeline monopolies. Liberalisation of CO 2 pipeline construction at EU level could eliminate the transit rent and is shown to reduce by two-thirds the differences between countries in terms of cost per tonne of CO 2 exported. Reaching agreement on such liberalisation may be politically challenging, since the payoffs are shown to be strongly divergent across countries.

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“…2 Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011) analyzed the strategic value of a adding the Russian pipeline North Stream.…”

Section: The European Natural Gas Industry and Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price Patterns Resulting from Different Producer Behavior in Spatial Equilibrium

Mathiesen

2012

SSRN Journal

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We are concerned with economic analyses of markets from the perspective of supporting a decision maker selling in the market. The competitive pressure and the price formation are central issues. The goal of this paper is to highlight the remarkably different price patterns obtained from different modes of seller behavior in a spatial market. This is exemplified by models of price taking versus the oligopolistic Cournot mode of behavior. Although a particular market, namely the European market for natural gas is used for illustration, the insights from this exercise apply to any industry where suppliers have market power, their locations differ, and their costs of supplying individual segments of the market are non-negligible and differ. When market power is present and one seeks insight into competition and price formation, details in other dimensions cannot compensate for not modeling the exertion of market power.

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Investment Options and Bargaining Power: The Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas*

Cited by 75 publications

References 34 publications

Pipeline Power: A Case Study of Strategic Network Investments

Pipeline Power: A Case Study of Strategic Network Investments

International Transport of Captured $$\hbox {CO}_2$$ CO 2 : Who Can Gain and How Much?

Price Patterns Resulting from Different Producer Behavior in Spatial Equilibrium

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