2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.01.018
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Investment policy in family controlled firms

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Cited by 314 publications
(328 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…Burkart et al (2003) formalize this argument in a model in which family control substitutes weak formal institutions to resolve the classic ownermanager agency problem. Also, their long-term commitment to the firm lessen agency conflicts with debt holders which induce the firm to undertake safer projects resulting a lower cost of debt financing (Anderson et al, 2003 andAnderson et al, 2012) and both factors tend to reduce the precautionary demand for cash.…”
Section: Family Ownership and Political Connectionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Burkart et al (2003) formalize this argument in a model in which family control substitutes weak formal institutions to resolve the classic ownermanager agency problem. Also, their long-term commitment to the firm lessen agency conflicts with debt holders which induce the firm to undertake safer projects resulting a lower cost of debt financing (Anderson et al, 2003 andAnderson et al, 2012) and both factors tend to reduce the precautionary demand for cash.…”
Section: Family Ownership and Political Connectionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, when breaking long-term investment down into its two components (R&D and capital expenditures), it emerged that FFs prefer investing in physical assets relative to riskier R&D projects than NFFs. Additional tests indicate that FFs receive fewer patent citations per dollar of R&D investment relative to NFFs (Anderson et al, 2012).…”
Section: Ffs Dividends and Investments Policiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nevertheless, Chrisman and Patel [58] found that family firms invest less in R&D, and, when they do, these investments are subject to adjustments based on the performance and prior aspiration levels of the family firm. Thus, recent empirical findings point that family ownership negatively influences R&D investment; that is, it decreases the level of R&D intensity (e.g., [13,59]). Moreover, family firms with higher family involvement may pursue family-oriented goals and are willing to sacrifice economic performance in order to preserve family wealth [58], which can lead to severe conflicts with other shareholders or stakeholders.…”
Section: Family Ownership As a Moderating Role In The Multigroup Analmentioning
confidence: 99%