Most importantly, we have carefully revised the typology of herding (Figure 1 and related explanation) and the motivation for selecting the Russian market to investigate herding behavior. Moreover, we have formulated testable hypothesis in relation with herding asymmetries, political turmoil, announcement days, and oil price fluctuations. At the same time, we have deleted the tests assessing whether herding effects are more pronounced for companies with less transparent information environment; these tests did not form a coherent part of the study any more. In the revised manuscript, in relation with herding asymmetries, political turmoil, announcement days, and oil price fluctuations we first provide a theoretical justification for the herding phenomenon. Afterwards, empirical evidence is listed; we review studies from the field. Finally, we argue how political events, announcements of key policy decisions and macroeconomic news releases, and oil price fluctuations can motivate herding driven by fundamental and non-fundamental information.