“…Representative investor theories explain these asymmetries by leverage effects, by volatility feedback mechanisms which raise the risk premium and reduce the impact of good news relative to bad news, and by stochastic bubble models in which the asymmetry is caused by the bursting of the bubble (see inter alia, Black (1976), Blanchard andWatson (1982), Christie (1982), French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) and Campbell and Hentschel (1992), Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Bhattacharya and Yu (2008) and Lin and Sornet (2013)). The alternative explanation is found in the microstructure and investor heterogeneity theories whereby investors differ in their opinions about the fundamental values of stocks (see inter alia Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990), Harris and Raviv (1993), Shalen (1993), Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1997), Ackert et al (2002), Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003), Huang and Thakor (2013) and Fletcher and Marshall (2014)). This latter explanation is recognized in the MDH and microstructure literatures to drive the relation between trading volumes and return volatilities, and is supported in our study of the market for corporate control.…”