Investor protection and corporate governance

Abstract

Recent research has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.

Corporate Governance and Firm Financial Performance: Do Ownership and Board Size Matter?

“…A lot of attention has focused on the relationship between ownership structure and corporation performance. For instance a rich research agenda on the implications of ownership structure on corporate governance by La Portal, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) affirm that when the legal structure does not offer sufficient protection for outside investors and entrepreneurs, original owners are forced to maintain large positions in their companies which result in a concentrated form of ownership thus having implications on ownership structure. On the other hand, bulk of the evidence according to Shirley and Walsh (2001) indicates that privately held firms are more efficient and more profitable than publicly held ones although the evidence differs on the relative merit of the identity of each private owner.…”

Influência Política na Contratação de Empregados por Empresas Estatais

“…Como a proteção dos direitos dos acionistas minoritários não é considerada em ambientes com pouca ou nenhuma transparência (LA PORTA et al, 2000), os políticos podem usar a sua influência para direcionar os investimentos feitos pelas SOEs com o intuito de obter ganhos privados. Sendo assim, a eficiência dos investimentos pode ser comprometida, tendo em vista que provavelmente as empresas estatais podem priorizar os objetivos sociais em detrimento dos econômicos.…”

Gerenciamento de resultados por meio de decisões operacionais e a governança corporativa: análise das indústrias siderúrgicas e metalúrgicas brasileiras

“…Esses conjuntos de mecanismos são utilizados para que os investidores externos possam se proteger da expropriação dos investidores internos (La Porta et al 2000).…”