IP-for-IP or Cash-for-IP? R&D Competition and the Market for Technology

Abstract

We analyze how firms might benefit from trading restrictions in the market for technology. We show that restricting trade to reciprocal exchange (“IP-for-IP” barter instead of cash transactions), as in cross-licensing agreements, alters the allocation of R&D resources and reduces overinvestment in R&D. The tighter are the trading restrictions, the higher are the costs that are due to forgone gains from trade. Our analysis of the trade-offs involved shows that firms benefit from IP-for-IP restrictions, compared to both free trade and no trade environments, in industries where: (1) firms differ in their capabilities to commercialize IP; and (2) patent complementarities exist

Synthesis Of Dipyrrolobenzo[1,2‐a : 2′,1′‐c][1,4]diazepine Scaffold Via Three‐Component Reaction

“…Indolizinoindole derivatives have also shown significant biological activity, as evidenced by numerous publications [18–20] . The indolizino[8,7‐ b ]indole skeleton has been found in natural bioactive substances, which possess notable analgesic, [21] antitumor, [22] and antibacterial [23] effects.…”